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Abstract 
Typically, cloud computing has been embraced by businesses. However, this master thesis introduces 
the personal cloud – a new cloud concept proposed to address personal needs. By bringing cloud 
computing into the personal sphere, the different personal computing devices are enabled to share 
resources and collaborate to form new and richer services; their resources could be made accessible 
from everywhere and to be shared among family and friends.  
However, putting together services from different devices, across different networks into compound 
services and sharing resources with other individuals, while ensuring sufficient access control is a 
major challenge. This demands for proper security solutions, such as trust establishment, secure 
authentication and identity management. Solutions for personal identity management and 
establishment of long-lasting security associations are proposed, by introducing the mobile phone as 
an authentication token and a personal identity provider service. The possibly to put the identity 
provider on the mobile phone is also evaluated. 
A high-level CORAS security analysis of cloud computing in general and particularly related to the 
new personal cloud is performed, to highlight some problematic areas regarding security. 
A working prototype which uses mobile authentication for SIP telephony has been developed as an 
example of a personalized service. By pointed out how the prototype can be further expanded, it is 
shown how a personalized service can be a fully integrated part of the personal cloud and its security 
government. 
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Terminology 
Authentication Authentication is any process, through which one proves and verifies certain 
information, i.e. determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who or 
what it is declared to be. Authentication requires that the information be 
checked for a single, previously identified, entity. 
Authenticator An authenticator represents an authentication service, which is contacted by a 
supplicant seeking to authenticate and gaining access to a networked service 
(See also Supplicant). 
Authorization Authorization is the process of giving someone permission to do or have 
something. Client A client is a system that accesses a (remote) service on another 
computer by some kind of network. 
Credentials A credential is defined as an object that is verified when presented to the verifier 
in an authentication transaction. 
Identification Identification is a process through which one ascertains the identity of another 
person or entity. Identification must uniquely identify a given entity. 
Identity Provider The Identity Provider is an entity which provides Service Providers with access to 
different authentication mechanisms, and which performs the user 
authentication on behalf of the Service Providers. The Identity Provider is thus a 
trusted party, and Service-Level-Agreements usually exist between the Service 
Providers and the Identity Providers for this purpose. 
Personal Domain Personal resources such as personal data or services, either services exposed by 
own computing devices, which may be carried with you or be present at a 
location where you regularly stay, such as home, workplace and holiday house, 
or services hosted on the Internet providing access to personal data or services is 
considered a part of your personal domain. 
Server A computer software application that carries out some task (i.e. provides a 
service) on behalf of yet another piece of software called a client. 
Service Provider A service provider is an entity that provides services to other entities. Usually this 
refers to a business that provides subscription or metered service to other 
businesses or individuals. Examples of these services include Internet access, 
Mobile phone service, and web application hosting. 
 
Service domains can be distinguished by being either higher-level or lower-level. 
Higher-level service domains include mobile telecommunication operators and 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Lower-level service domains include work 
places, Internet-cafes, private Local Area Networks etc. 
Service Domains The mobile environment is also consisting of a set of different service domains. A 
service domain can be e.g. a private domain (like home), it can be the work 
domain or it can be a public domain (like an Internet-cafe). Within each of these 
domains (which are just examples), several services can exist. 
SIM The SIM is a logical module that runs on an Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) type of 
Smart Card. The SIM is a tamper resistant device, which is used to store keys to 
authenticate mobile users, messages, and phone numbers. 
Supplicant A supplicant at one end of a link seeks to be authenticated by an authenticator 
attached to the other end. It is often a software application installed on an end-
user’s computer. The user invokes the supplicant and submits credentials to 
authenticate, and if authentication succeeds, the authenticator grants access to 
the requested networked service (See also Authenticator). 
Trust Certainty of whom you are dealing with. 
Table 2 Terminology 
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1 Introduction 
In the modern life of today many individuals have a lot of connected computing devices such as 
mobile phones, computers, set-top boxes, video game consoles, etc. Some of these devices have 
wired- while others have wireless connectivity. Some wireless connected devices may switch from 
Wi-Fi network to mobile network, and the devices may be relocated among for instance home, 
workplace and holiday house. These devices may host a lot of different resources, such as broadband 
connection, storage of multimedia content (pictures, videos and documents), presentation ability 
(screens, projectors, speakers and head-sets), may have processing capacity, accessibility for 
telephony or TV-broadcast content. As people move around, the personal service of each individual 
should be available wherever they are. When visiting other individuals, you want access to your 
personal services using the host’s services (such as broad band connection and presentation devices). 
The same way you may want to share your own devices and services when having visitors. It’s natural 
to think of individuals in a family living together sharing and utilizing each other’s devices and 
services. As the devices and services cross communication boundaries the communication must be 
properly secured, and as devices and services are shared between individuals there must exist some 
kind of identity management service. The needs for secured communication and identity 
management within the personal domain will be examined during this master thesis.  
As the number of services provided on the Internet or within the personal domain (such as your 
home) increases, the proper management of user identities is becoming urgent. More and more 
services which may have privacy concerns and/or economical impact for either yourselves or the 
service providers. Every individual need a way to identify when accessing connected services 
wherever they are.  
Thus, this master thesis will also examine if the mobile phone is a good candidate for the personal 
need for identity management. As services in the personal domain need to be secured and may be 
shared among individuals, we will further examine if it could be advantageous to expose identity 
management on the mobile phone as a service within this personal domain.  
1.1 Motivation 
The main motivation for this study is that personalized service access could become much more 
streamlined than it currently is, if only certain research areas gained more attention. Many of the 
technological foundations already exist for enabling personalized and ubiquitous access to services; 
however, there is a lack of focus on some areas. This thesis aims at highlighting some such areas, 
discuss limitations, propose improvements and provide some examples of implementations to 
alleviate current limitations.  
1.2 Problem definition & statements 
The overall problem statement, which is sought answers to through this thesis, is as follows: 
“Can identity management technologies facilitate end-user security requirements and user 
mobility for ubiquitous, personalized access to rich and dynamic services within the personal 
domain?” 
To be able to provide at least a partial answer to this question, the following problem statements will 
be investigated: 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
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• What will the future personal domain of services look like? 
• What are the particular security requirements to services within the personal domain? 
• How can services be incorporated into the future personal service environments while 
coping with these security requirements? 
1.3 Challenges 
Every person is surrounded by more and more communicating computing devices which could have 
collaborated to form new and richer services to benefit the user. As these devices are heterogeneous 
systems running on widely different platforms, offering different services, supporting various 
protocols and standards, and doesn’t have well-defined integration points, there is a major challenge 
to working out how these devices and services can interoperate in an elegant and secure way. Many 
of the devices are ubiquitous, moving between different networks, and there is a major challenge to 
find a secure way those devices can collaborate spanning different networks and locations. Finally, it 
is desirable to share resources between devices or even individuals, and this could benefit from 
utilizing identity management. A major challenge with the work is that there is a lot of competing 
identity frameworks, not well adapted for personalized services shattered between ubiquitous 
devices. 
1.4 Objectives 
The objectives are to identity a relevant problem, to provide a thorough treatment of the problem 
area, to design a novel architecture to cope with the problem, to propose solutions to the problem, 
to define requirements and implement a prototype, and finally to apply the insight achieved by 
implementing a prototype to further illuminate the original problem. 
1.5 Methodology 
The methodology carried out while working with this master thesis has been adapted to the different 
parts of the work: 
Literature studies and studies of state-of-the-art – To get insight into the research area, a wide range 
of books and papers has been studied to form a basis knowledge and to get insights of the state-of-
the-art of the research area. 
Constructive research methodology [1] – A common computer science method which aims at 
producing novel solutions to practically and theoretically relevant problems. The constructive 
approach means problem solving through the construction of models, diagrams, plans, organisations, 
etc. To achieve the ideas of constructive research throughout its many phases, the author has tried 
to seek a practically relevant problem, to obtain an understanding of the topic and the problem, to 
construct a solution, to demonstrate that the solution works, to show theoretical connections and 
research contribution, and finally to examine the scope of the solutions applicability. 
UP and UML [2] – The software design and development methodology used is Unified Process (UP) 
and the accompanying diagrams are based on Unified Modeling Language (UML). 
CORAS [3] – In chapter 8, the CORAS process is used for high-level security analysis. The CORAS 
process is a system development process based on the integration of UP and a standardised security 
risk management process, using the CORAS language, a risk modelling language with graphical 
representation. 
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1.6 Organization of the thesis 
In this section the organization of this thesis and a reader’s guide are presented. 
After the introduction chapter, this master thesis is divided into two main partitions, and finally 
concluded in the conclusion chapter. The first partition, the background partition is providing insight 
into state-of-the-art relating to the research area. The second partition, the contribution partition is 
proposing new concepts, performing analysis, presenting case studies and discussing the proposed 
concepts and elaborating the implementations/realizations. 
The thesis is divided into groups according to different computer topics discussed:  
• Information security and identity management 
• Mobile computing 
• Cloud computing 
 
Each topic is first discussed at different abstraction levels where first concepts are presented and 
then realizing technologies. For both concepts and technologies the fundamental building block level 
are first presented, and then the building blocks are combined into systems spanning several of those 
building blocks. 
The topics are if applicable placed in a topic group and in an appropriate abstraction layer, according 
to Figure 1.  
Figure 2 illustrates a reader’s guide to this master thesis; now a brief introduction of each chapter is 
presented. 
Chapter 1 has provided an introduction to the topic of this thesis, then gives a motivation of the 
subject being discussed, presents a problem definition, the problem statements, challenges and 
objectives being examined. 
Chapter 2 through 6 are a background partition providing insight into state-of-the-art relating to the 
research area. The reader with sufficient knowledge into these topics may optionally skip some or all 
these chapters altogether and proceed directly at chapter 7. 
 
Figure 1 Organization of topics 
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Chapter 2 first gives insight into information security concepts, paying special attention to 
authentication. Then the Identity management concept is discussed  
Chapter 3 presents state-of-the-art Authentication, Authorization and Identity Management 
frameworks. 
Chapter 4 presents the general ideas of mobile computing, including personal area networks, 
ubiquitous computing and mobile networks technologies such as GSM / UMTS and IMS. 
Chapter 5 describes state-of-the-art service provisioning, such as cloud computing, the current 
service models and their enablers. 
Chapter 6 presents some of the enablers for a more personalized cloud computing experience. Then 
technologies for personalized services, such as SIP and VPN are presented, preparing for the case 
studies in the contribution partition. 
 
Figure 2 Guide to read this thesis 
Chapter 7 through 10 are the contribution partition of this thesis, proposing new mobile security 
concepts, a personalized cloud concept, performing security analysis of the cloud concepts and finally 
presenting two case studies where the established concepts are demonstrated. 
Chapter 7 is proposing a cloud concept for individuals – the personal cloud. The chapter presents 
some characteristics of the personal cloud, explains the need for this new deployment model, 
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presents challenges, proposes solutions such as new mobile security concepts for mobile 
authentication and a mobile identity provider. Finally, the chapter presents some assorted 
theoretical case studies. Section 7.4 is discussing personal cloud security and depends upon topics 
presented in chapter 2, 3 and 4 in the background partition. The rest of the chapter depends upon 
topics presented in chapter 5 and 6 in the background partition. 
Chapter 8 is performing a high-level CORAS security analysis of cloud computing in general and 
particularly related to the new personal cloud. 
 
Chapter 9 and 10 are practical case studies demonstrating the introduced security service based on 
mobile authentication for providing a secure service. These chapters depend upon topics presented 
in chapter 6 in the background partition. 
Chapter 9 presents a working solution using mobile authentication for SIP telephony that has been 
developed as a proof of concept. Telephony is a good example of a typical personal cloud service. 
Chapter 10 suggests a practical solution using mobile authentication for VPN services. 
Chapter 11 finally gives a conclusion summarising the contributions of this thesis, providing a critical 
review of the work done and drawing some lines for further works. 
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2 Information security and identity management 
In this chapter, the key concepts of information security will be described, starting with a 
presentation of the fundamental security qualities, while paying special attention to authentication. 
Then a presentation of identity management follows.  
2.1 Information security 
When it comes to information security, there is a set of fundamental components or qualities that 
should always be considered in any solution: 
Confidentiality – Confidentiality means ensuring that information is accessible/ readable only to 
those authorized. 
Integrity – Integrity means that the data is identically maintained during any operation (such as 
transfer, storage or retrieval). In business terms, data integrity is the assurance that data is 
consistent, certified and can be reconciled. 
Availability – Availability is the proportion of time a system is in a functioning condition.  
Authenticity – Authenticity is the possibility to ensure that the data, transactions, communications or 
documents (electronic or physical) are genuine. It is also important for authenticity to validate that 
both parties involved are who they claim they are (authentication). 
Accountability and non-repudiation – Accountability and non-repudiation means the ability to trace 
actions in a system back to a specific user, the latter ensuring that a performed action cannot be 
denied later on, e.g. by using strong cryptography and digital signatures. 
Trust – This property refers to a relationship between stakeholders, where one stakeholder believes 
in claims made by another stakeholder (e.g. that data is securely stored, that data is not misused 
etc.). Trust may be symmetric, and it is not necessarily a transitive property.  
Authentication (and inherent topics such as identity management) is the most relevant component 
among information security components for this thesis, and will be further presented in the next 
section as later contributions heavily rely on this security quality. 
2.2 Authentication 
Authentication is the act of establishing or confirming someone (or something) as authentic, that is, 
that claims made by or about the subject are true. In computing authentication usually means the 
proper verification of someone’s identity. 
2.2.1 Factors of authentication 
The term two-factor authentication (or even three-factor authentication) is used when elements 
representing two (or three) factors are required for identification. The elements have to be picked 
from the following three element classes: 
• Something you know – e.g. a secret, such as a password or a Personal identity number (PIN) 
• Something you have – e.g. passport or an ID-card 
• Something you are – biometric data, e.g. fingerprint or the face geometry 
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The two elements of two-factor authentication might for instance be a combination of something the 
user has (e.g. a smartcard) and something the user knows (e.g. a PIN code). When two-factor 
authentication or better is used, it is said to be strong authentication. 
2.2.2 Authentication schemes 
Since one of the foundations for identity management is user authentication, we now briefly 
consider possible authentication schemes which can be incorporated into identity management 
solutions and their strengths with regards to such incorporation. 
Username/password-based schemes – Username/password schemes are the most prevalent on the 
Internet today. They are used in services on the Web, as well as for many Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) installations, Wi-Fi networks, etc. Username/password authentication is usually not sufficiently 
secure. The most obvious weaknesses of username/password schemes is the possibility of guessing 
attacks, brute force-attacks and dictionary attacks, dependency on the users being careful in the 
selection of passwords, the fact that users tend to write down passwords, as well as that they are 
often transferred in clear text across the Internet, thus making eavesdroppers able to pick them up. 
Username/passwords are also increasingly subject to phishing attacks. The responsibility of security 
should not primarily be left with the users, since they often have a misconception of what constitutes 
a secure password and what does not. 
Smart Card with PKI – Some enterprises and governmental services has adopted Smart Cards for use 
with particular services like Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or governmental portals. Smart Cards 
usually integrate Public-Key-Infrastructure (PKI)-solutions for user authentication and digital 
signatures. The major drawback of such solutions is the cost of deployment (each user must have a 
Smart Card-reader and a Smart Card) and maintenance (replacement of Smart Cards, removal of 
users, addition of new users).  
One-Time-Password with code generator – Another option is to use One-Time-Passwords (OTP) 
based on code generators (physical, electronic devices typically capable of generating 4-6 digit 
codes), which have been taken into widespread use by many Internet-banking services. However, 
these solutions have some of the drawbacks as Smart Card-based solutions; they are costly in 
deployment and maintenance due to the added device. However, the security may be quite good. 
One-Time-Password with SMS – There are solutions that allow users to receive OTP through the Short 
Message Service (SMS) on their mobile phones. These are quite secure (it requires substantial 
resources to be able to eavesdrop on GSM communication), but may be costly due to the added cost 
of sending an SMS for each authentication. 
Depending on the volume of authentication transactions in an enterprise, this may become a 
relatively large expense. 
Pre-shared keys – Pre-shared keys may be secure, but the administrative procedures for deployment 
may be time-consuming and costly. It is crucial that the transport of a pre-shared key between two 
locations is performed in a security-conscious manner, i.e., not sent by unencrypted mail or stored in 
transit in various locations. 
Device based – Some user devices have embedded identifiers which can be used for authentication. 
Wi-Fi adapters, for example, have a global unique identifier (the MAC-address). This address is 
sometimes used for filtering access to Wi-Fi networks. 
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However, such addresses follow the devices, and not the users. Hence, if one user wants to access a 
service through another user’s device, he would not be correctly identified, and the premises for 
access to services would be wrong. 
2.3 Identity management 
Identity management [4][5] deals with identifying individuals in a system (such as a country, a 
network or an organization) and controlling the access to the resources in that system by placing 
restrictions on the established identities.  Identity management is typically in computer science 
related to how humans are identified and authorized across computer networks. It covers topics such 
as how users are assigned an identity, the protection of that identity and the supporting technologies 
such as network protocols, digital certificates, passwords, etc. Management is used in combination 
with “identity” as best practices and technological frameworks are built around the identity concept. 
Identity management is closely related to authentication, but it adds another layer of abstraction and 
is concerned with handling the different identifiers of the users and mappings of those to e.g. user 
accounts. Identity management solutions typically support one or several authentication 
mechanisms. 
Identity – Identity is defined [4] as the quality or condition of being the same. Identity can refer to a 
person or an object (e.g., a computer). People or objects can have several identities when working 
with different systems, or within a single system, if working in different roles. 
Identifiers – With identity management systems we are not working with the identities themselves 
(which are rather abstract), but with representations of them, i.e., through the use of identifiers. 
Identifiers are representations of identities, and can take on many different forms. The most 
common ones used on the Internet include e-mail addresses, usernames, mobile phone numbers, 
credit card numbers and social security numbers (SSN). These identifiers are unique within the 
context of a specific namespace. The link between these identifiers and the distinct identity they 
represent may be established in various ways, e.g. either by personal physical presence, or more 
vaguely when defining a profile in a Web portal.  
Two especially interesting topics in the context of identity management are Identity federation and 
Single Sign-On. 
2.3.1 Identity federation 
Identity federation is a concept aiming for identity portability across autonomous security domains. 
The goal of identity federation is to enable users of one domain to securely access another domain 
seamlessly, and without the need for completely redundant user administration.  
A common use of identity management systems is to federate different identifiers for the same user. 
Let’s say a user has an account in an Internet-bank. He can then create an additional identifier with 
the identity provider and federate the bank identifier with that of the identity provider. The goal of 
an identity management system in this case is that if the user logs in with the identity provider 
identifier, he should automatically also be logged in with his identifier with the Internet-bank. 
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2.3.2 Single Sign-On 
With multiple, related, but independent systems, Single Sign-On (SSO) is introduced as a solution to 
avoid that a user needs to log in repeatedly. With Single-Sign-On a user logs in once and gains access 
to all systems within a Circle-of-Trust (CoT), without 
being prompted to log in again at each of them. See 
section 3.2.4 for some SSO initiatives.  
2.3.3 Circle-of-Trust 
When introducing identity management frameworks like 
this, a common concept is the so called Circle-of-Trust  
(see Figure 3). A CoT usually consists of several service 
providers (SP) and one or more identity providers (IdP). 
The IdP is an entity which provides SPs with access to 
different authentication mechanisms, and which 
performs the user authentication on behalf of the 
service providers. The IdP is thus a trusted party, and 
Service-Level-Agreements usually exist between the SPs 
and the IdPs for this purpose. 
2.4 Current authentication and IdM situation 
The current authentication and identity management situation is quite complex. Various kind of 
services allow usage of one or more authentication mechanisms, as depicted in Figure 4. And bring 
even more complexity into the situation, since the authentication mechanisms are usually provided 
on a pr. service basis, i.e., one set of credentials for each specific service. 
 
Figure 4 The current, quite complex, authentication and identity management situation 
The first benefit additional identity management solutions have for this situation is the possibility to 
enable several service providers to use more advanced (i.e., more secure) authentication 
mechanisms.  
The second benefit is that several services, either from the same or from different service providers, 
can allow Single-Sign-On for the user, i.e., that a user can move between certain service providers 
without re-authenticating. This is illustrated in Figure 5, where several services on the World-Wide-
Web (WSn) have access to common authentication mechanisms through the use of an identity 
management framework e.g. based on the Liberty Alliance specifications (see section 3.2.2). 
 
Figure 3 A Circle-of-Trust 
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Figure 5 Enabling the use of the same authentication 
As the two last sections of this chapter have shown, the current authentication and identity 
management situation is quite complex, although there are solutions that can simplify the situation 
for both the service providers and the end-users. However, many of the existing identity 
management frameworks are quite complex in themselves, currently making the threshold for 
service providers to universally adopt them a bit too high. 
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3 Identity Management technologies 
In this chapter standards and frameworks for authentication, authorization and identity management 
technologies are presented. 
3.1 Authentication and authorization frameworks 
In this section the OATH authentication framework and the OAuth authorization frameworks are 
presented. Both are open initiatives offering easier collaboration and better security between 
services and service providers on the Internet. Finally the RADIUS protocol is presented.  
3.1.1 OATH (Open Authentication) 
OATH [6] is an initiative for Open Authentication; an industry-wide collaboration to develop an open 
reference architecture using open standards to promote the adoption of strong authentication. It has 
passed forty coordinating and / or contributing members and is proposing standards for a variety of 
authentication technologies, seeking to offer simplified use at a lower cost. 
OATH provides an industry roadmap for open strong authentication and specifications for the 
industry to adopt strong authentication mechanisms. Here are three examples of major 
authentication methods proposed: 
• Subscriber identity module (SIM) -based authentication (using GSM/GPRS SIM) 
• Public key infrastructure (PKI) -based authentication (using X.509.v3 certificate) 
• One Time Password (OTP) -based authentication 
These three methods specify the core set of authentication credentials (SIM secret, X.509 certificate, 
and One Time Password). This core set of credentials should co-exist and interoperate across devices 
and applications. 
SIM-based authentication – This authentication method predominates in telecommunications, and is 
emerging as an important authentication method in public Wi-Fi networks (authentication and 
roaming across GSM/GPRS and 802.11 networks).  
PKI-based authentication – PKI is a fundamental security component of all major Internet protocols 
for authentication and communication (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS), WS-Security (see section 
3.2.3), IPSEC IKE, 802.1x, Session Initiation Protocol (See section 6.4.1)). (TLS, IPSEC and IKE are 
presented in section 6.4.2.1). The choice of X.509 (see section 6.4.2.2) certificates as strong 
credentials is also consistent with deployment trends in enterprise and government markets. 
Furthermore, certificates offer additional security functionality beyond authentication (e.g., for form 
and e-mail signing and file encryption). 
OTP-based authentication – This method is intended to act as a bridge between legacy and modern 
applications. OTP credentials will facilitate integration with applications that rely solely on user 
passwords (e.g., Web applications, mainframe applications and ERP systems). Because end users are 
already familiar with static passwords, a device-generated password can greatly facilitate the 
transition to stronger authentication (for one thing, the application user interface does not change). 
Therefore, support for OTP is essential to the successful propagation of strong authentication. 
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3.1.2 OAuth 
OAuth (Open Authorization) [7] is an open protocol that allows sharing of security context without 
the need to share identity / credentials. For instance users might share private resources such as 
contacts, photos and videos stored on one site with another site without having to hand out their 
username and password. OAuth is complementary to OpenID (see section 0), but a separate service. 
OAuth was created by studying other proprietary protocols such as Google AuthSub, AoL OpenAuth, 
Yahoo BBAuth, Flickr API, etc., each of which provide a method for exchanging user credentials for an 
access token, to provide a open alternative to these. 
OAuth defines three roles – client, server, and resource owner – which are present in any OAuth 
transaction. In some cases the client is also the resource owner. The resource owner (user) grants 
access to a protected resource on one site (server), to another site (client). A protected resource is a 
resource stored on the server which requires authentication in order to access it. Protected 
resources are owned/controlled by the resource owner. Anyone requesting access to a protected 
resource must be authorized by the resource owner to do so.  
OAuth has three kinds of credentials: client credentials, temporary credentials, and token 
credentials.  
Client credentials – Used to authenticate the client which allows the server to collect information 
about the clients. Could also be used to offer some clients special treatment, e.g. throttling-free 
access, or provide the resource owner more information about the clients seeking to access the 
protected resources. 
Token credentials – Used in place of the resource owner’s username and password, to access the 
protected resource without having to know the resource owner’s password. Token credentials 
include a token identifier. The token identifier is most often a random string of characters that is 
unique/hard to guess, and paired with a secret to 
protect it from being used by unauthorized parties. 
Token credentials have typically limited duration and 
can be revoked at any time by the resource owner 
without affecting other token credentials issued to 
other clients.  
Temporary credentials – Used to identify the 
authorization request. This offer additional flexibility 
and security when accommodating different kind of 
clients (web-based, desktop, mobile, etc.) 
A practical example of how OAuth is used is shown in 
Figure 6. In the example the client is a web-based 
application, so the client is split between a front-end 
component, usually running within a web browser on 
the resource owner’s computer, and a back-end 
component, running on the client’s server. The resource 
owner is interacting with one part of the client 
application (the front-end client), while the server is receiving authentication requests from another 
part (the back-end client).  
 
Figure 6 OAuth example 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 29 
3.1.3 RADIUS 
Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) [8] is a networking protocol that provides 
centralized Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) services. 
The main functions of RADIUS are to authenticate users before granting them access to a network, to 
authorize those users for certain network services and to account for usage of those services. 
Diameter is a successor to RADIUS. Diameter extends the base protocol by adding new commands 
and/or attributes, such as those for use of the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (see section 
3.1.3.2). 
3.1.3.1 RADIUS architecture 
As RADIUS supports several different functions which in turn query a myriad of directories and 
services, most implementations of RADIUS have a modular design that supports pluggable 
integration of various directory- and service implementations, such as Sun’s Pluggable Authentication 
Modules (PAM). This section will focus on the authentication and authorization functions of RADIUS. 
First, the user typically requests access to a particular network resource at a service server using 
access credentials. The service server then sends a RADIUS Access Request message to the RADIUS 
server, requesting authorization to grant access via the RADIUS protocol. This request includes access 
credentials, typically in the form of username and password or security certificate provided by the 
user. Then the RADIUS server verifies if the credentials are correct using authentication schemes like 
PAP, CHAP or EAP (see section 3.1.3.2). Usually, the RADIUS server queries external sources like SQL, 
Kerberos, LDAP or Active Directory servers to verify the user’s credentials. The RADIUS server then 
returns one of three responses to the service server: Access Reject, Access Challenge or Access 
Accept. 
Access Reject - The user is unconditionally denied access to all requested network resources at the 
service server. This could be because of failure to provide proof of identification or an unknown or 
inactive user account. 
Access Challenge - Requests additional information from the 
user such as a secondary password, PIN, token or card. Access 
Challenge is also used in more complex authentication dialogs 
where a secure tunnel is established between the user 
machine and the RADIUS server in a way that the access 
credentials are hidden from the service server originating the 
access request. 
Access Accept - The user is granted access. Once the user is 
authenticated, the RADIUS server will often check that the 
user is authorised to use the network service requested, as 
the user may have been granted access to a company’s Wi-Fi 
network, but not its VPN service.  
An example is provided in Figure 7 where a remote user wants to access a NAS client: 
• A remote user connects to a NAS client (1). 
• The NAS sends an Access Request to the RADIUS server (2). 
 
Figure 7 RADIUS example 
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• The RADIUS server performs a challenge response with the NAS client; An Access Challenge 
(3) is sent from the RADIUS server to the NAS client and a new Access Request (4) is returned 
as a response to the challenge. 
• The RADIUS server verifies the response from the challenge by looking up in a kind of user 
database, doing a computation and comparing if the values match, and if the authentication 
succeeds, an Access Accept is returned from RADIUS server to the NAS client (5). 
• The NAS client finally returns Session Start to the remote user (6). 
3.1.3.2 EAP/EAP-SIM 
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [9] is an authentication framework often used in wireless 
networks and by Point-to-Point connections.  
EAP-SIM [10] is an EAP-extension that specifies a mechanism for mutual authentication and session 
key distribution using the SIM card. EAP-SIM includes enhancements to the GSM authentication (see 
section 4.3.2.1), providing mutual authentication and larger random numbers and keys. The EAP-SIM 
client issues a random number that is used to verify correct identity of the authentication server, 
which results in mutual authentication. To provide larger keys, the EAP-SIM client combines several 
authentication triplets to generate authentication responses and encryption keys, which in turn are 
combined into one large key. EAP-SIM also supports these two optional features; Fast re-
authentication and identity protection.  
Fast re-authentication – Re-authentication without using GSM’s authentication system, thus offers a 
less costly authentication.  
Identity protection – Use the same concept as GSM, where temporary identifiers protect the users’ 
privacy. 
3.2 Identity Management frameworks 
In this section a lot of (partially competing) security specifications for identity frameworks, 
particularly related to Web, are presented. 
3.2.1 Open Group Identity Management 
Open Group Identity Management Forum is promoting open standards-based identity management, 
describing best practice identity architectures, participating in standardization activities and 
encouraging product vendors to follow these standards. The Identity Management White Paper [5] 
gives a good overview of key concepts, challenges and possible solutions to identity management. 
3.2.2 Liberty Alliance 
Liberty Alliance specifies open standards for identity management. The specifications define sets of 
protocols that collectively provide solutions for identity federation management, cross-domain 
authentication, and session management. The specifications also define provider metadata schemas 
that may be used for making a priori arrangements between providers. 
The Liberty architecture [11] contains three actors: Principal, identity provider (IdP), and service 
provider (SP). A Principal is an entity (e.g. an end user) that has an identity provided by an identity 
provider. A service provider provides services to the Principal. 
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The Liberty Alliance architecture is shown in Figure 8; Once 
the Principal is authenticated to the identity provider (1), the 
identity provider can provide an authentication assertion to 
the Principal (2), who can present the assertion to the service 
provider (2). The Principal is authenticated to the service 
provider if the service provider trusts the assertion.  
An identity federation is said to exist between an identity 
provider and a service provider when the service provider 
accepts authentication assertions regarding a particular 
Principal from the identity provider. The specifications define 
a protocol where the identity of the Principal can be federated 
between the identity provider and the service provider. This 
federated approach does not require the Principal to re-authenticate and can support privacy 
controls established by the Principal. 
The specification relies on the SAML specification (see section 3.2.5). In SAML terminology, an 
identity provider acts as an Asserting Party and an Authentication Authority, while a service provider 
acts as a Relying Party. 
3.2.3 Web service security  
There are several security related extensions to web services. The most important ones are:  
WS-Security [12] is a flexible and feature-rich extension to SOAP to apply security to Web services 
and was published by OASIS. WS-Security describes how to sign SOAP messages to assure integrity 
and also provide non-repudiation. It also describes how to encrypt SOAP messages to assure 
confidentiality and finally it describes how to attach security tokens. The specification allows a 
variety of signature formats, encryptions algorithms and multiple trust domains, and is open to 
various security token models. 
XML Signature [13] (also called XMLDsig, XML-DSig, XML-Sig) is a W3C recommendation that defines 
an XML syntax for digital signatures. Functionally, it has much in common with PKCS#7 but is more 
extensible and geared towards signing XML documents. 
WS-Trust [14] is a specification and OASIS standard that provides extensions to WS-Security, 
specifically dealing with the issuing, renewing, and validating of security tokens, as well as with ways 
to establish, assess the presence of, and broker trust relationships between participants in a secure 
message exchange.  
WS-Federation [15] is in short an Identity Federation specification and defines mechanisms for 
allowing disparate security realms to broker information on identities, identity attributes and 
authentication. The Web Services Federation specification defines mechanisms to allow different 
security realms to federate by allowing and brokering trust of identities, attributes, authentication 
between participating Web services. 
3.2.4 Single Sign-On initiatives 
There are several initiatives to where the user can sign-on once and access several systems.  
Web Single Sign-On Interoperability Profile [16] is a Web Services and Federated identity 
specification that defines interoperability between WS-Federation and the Liberty Alliance protocols. 
  
Figure 8 Liberty Alliance architecture 
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Web Single Sign-On Metadata Exchange Protocol [17] is a Web Services and Federated identity 
specification that defines mechanisms for a service to query an identity provider for metadata 
concerning the protocol suites it supports. The goal of this operation is to increase the ability of a 
given service to interoperate with a given identity provider. Both initiatives is a cooperation between 
Microsoft and Sun. 
SAML and Shibboleth is also coping with the SSO problem (next section, 3.2.5). 
3.2.5 Oasis SAML and Shibboleth 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [18] is an XML-based standard for exchanging 
authentication and authorization data between security domains, meaning, between an identity 
provider (a producer of assertions) and a service provider (a consumer of assertions). SAML is 
created by OASIS and its main mission is to solve the Web Browser Single Sign-On (SSO) problem. 
For instance the Liberty Alliance specification relies on the SAML specification.  
The Shibboleth is an architecture and open-source implementation for federated identity-based 
authentication and authorization infrastructure based on SAML. It is used to accomplish web Single 
Sign-On across or within organizational boundaries.  
Shibboleth has consists of two software parts: 
Identity Provider – Software run by an organization with users wishing to access a restricted service. 
Service Provider – Software run by the provider managing the restricted service. 
3.2.5.1 Authentication and assertions 
In the discussions in later chapters, there are a lot of 
examples where assertions are returned from an 
authentication request.  Here an example of 
authentication and assertions related to SAML, will be 
presented, as illustrated in Figure 9.  
An Attribute Query is a SAML query where a SAML 
Attribute Authority (AA) is queried for attributes. This SAML Attribute Authority might for instance be 
an Identity Provider. If a service consumer sends a Attribute Query request to an Identity Provider 
(1), the Identity Provider might return (2) the following SAML assertion to the service consumer, 
wrapped in a <samlp:Response> element (Table 3). 
<saml:Assertion 
   xmlns:saml=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion” 
   xmlns:xs=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema” 
   xmlns:xsi=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance” 
   xmlns:ds=”http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#” 
   ID=”_33776a319493ad607b7ab3e689482e45” Version=”2.0” IssueInstant=”2006-07-17T20:31:41Z”> 
   <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.org/SAML2</saml:Issuer> 
   <ds:Signature>...</ds:Signature> 
   <saml:Subject> 
     <saml:NameID Format=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:X509SubjectName”> 
       CN=trscavo@uiuc.edu,OU=User,O=NCSA-TEST,C=US 
     </saml:NameID> 
     <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:holder-of-key”> 
       <saml:SubjectConfirmationData> 
         <ds:KeyInfo> 
           <ds:X509Data> 
             <ds:X509Certificate> 
 MIICiDCCAXACCQDE+9eiWrm62jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJV 
 UzESMBAGA1UEChMJTkNTQS1URVNUMQ0wCwYDVQQLEwRVc2VyMRMwEQYDVQQDEwpT 
 ... 
 
Figure 9 SAML attribute query and response 
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             </ds:X509Certificate> 
           </ds:X509Data> 
         </ds:KeyInfo> 
       </saml:SubjectConfirmationData> 
     </saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
   </saml:Subject> 
   <saml:AttributeStatement> 
     <saml:Attribute 
       xmlns:x500=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500” x500:Encoding=”LDAP” 
       NameFormat=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri” 
       Name=”urn:oid:2.5.4.42”FriendlyName=”givenName”> 
       <saml:AttributeValue 
         xsi:type=”xs:string”>Tom</saml:AttributeValue> 
     </saml:Attribute> 
     <saml:Attribute 
       xmlns:x500=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:profiles:attribute:X500” x500:Encoding=”LDAP” 
       NameFormat=”urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:uri” 
       Name=”urn:oid:1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.115.121.1.26” FriendlyName=”mail”> 
       <saml:AttributeValue 
         xsi:type=”xs:string”>trscavo@gmail.com</saml:AttributeValue> 
     </saml:Attribute> 
   </saml:AttributeStatement> 
 </saml:Assertion> 
Table 3 SAML assertion 
The SAML assertion is signed (<ds:Signature> element) and contains a certificate of the IdP which 
has signed it (<ds:X509Certificate> element). If the assertion returned to the service consumer 
is forwarded to a service provider, and the service provider has trust in the IdP (that means has a 
copy of the IdP certificate / public key), the service provider is able to verify the authenticity of the 
SAML artefact and the grant access to the service consumer. 
3.2.6 OpenID 
OpenID [19] is an open, decentralized, free 
framework for user-centric digital identity 
management. It takes advantage of already existing 
internet technology (URI, HTTP, SSL, Diffie-Hellman) 
and realizes that people are already creating 
identities for themselves whether it be at their 
blog, photo stream, profile page, etc. With OpenID 
you can easily transform one of these existing URIs 
into an account which can be used at sites which 
support OpenID logins. 
Identities in OpenID are URIs, i.e., 
http://toranders.com. Some of the advantages of 
using URIs are that they are relatively simple, they 
are pervasive (used a lot) and easy to remember. 
The authentication process in practice involves 
verifying that the user owns a certain URI (i.e., their 
identity). 
The authentication process with OpenID consists of 5 major steps, as illustrated in Figure 10. The 
steps are: 
1. The end user visits a web site, e.g. a Web-shop, forum, blog or similar. 
2. The user enters his/her OpenID URI (e.g. http://toralux.myopenid.com). 
3. The user’s Web-browser is then redirected to an OpenID Identity Provider. 
 
Figure 10 The mobile ubiquitous environment 
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4. At the Identity Provider’s site, the user enters his/her credentials, in most cases a 
password. 
5. The user’s Web-browser is then redirected back to visited web site. 
In OpenID terminology, the web site which the user wishes to log in to (i.e., the service provider) is 
called a consumer. 
Figure 11 shows the OpenID authentication 
process: 
• Browser sends the user’s URL to the 
relaying party (RP), (1). 
• The RP consults the URL content to 
determine the OpenID provider’s (OP) 
location (not shown in the figure).  
• Then RP redirects the user to her OP 
to pick up an authentication token, as 
shown in (2) and (3). 
• The OP presents the user with an authentication screen asking for the user’s credentials (4). 
• If authentication is successful, the OP creates an authentication token to send to the RP as 
shown in (5) and (6).  
• If the OP and RP already know each other, this is the end of the authentication part of the 
process. 
• If not, the back-channel is used to register the user. 
Anyone can establish an OpenID Identity Provider; there is no need for a particular permission or 
registration process. Thus, it is possible to establish a personal identity provider, an identity provider 
for a community or for the general public. Libraries for implementing OpenID identity providers are 
available for various platforms and languages, e.g. for PHP, Ruby, Perl, Java etc. 
One of the main strengths 
of OpenID is perhaps the 
delegation of verification. It 
is possible to use a URI 
which is not registered by 
any OpenID Identity 
Provider as user identity, 
thus the identity can persist 
even when identity 
providers disappear (see 
example in Table 4). This is 
solved with delegation, which is realised by adding a certain code snippet to the HEAD section of the 
Web-page hosted at the index of the said URI. The part could for example look like the example. 
The major advantages of OpenID are: 
1. Highly distributed 
 
Figure 11 OpenID example 
  
Table 4 Example of OpenID delegation 
<head> 
<link rel=”opened.server” 
href=http://www.someidp.com> 
<link rel=”opened.delegate” 
href=”http://toranders.com”> 
</head> 
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2. Flexible – users can keep identity even when identity provider disappears (using 
delegation with their homepage URI as identity to different identity providers) 
3. Lightweight solution 
3.2.7 Eclipse Higgins 
Higgins [20] is an open-source framework and collaborative project which among other things 
develops components that can be used to build the different parts of an identity management 
system. The project has received technology contributions from among others IBM and Novell.  
The goal is to develop interoperable, protocol- and platform-independent solutions, and this is 
accomplished by providing developers with a common API for identity management, instead of 
requiring support for several different identity management solutions. There are two major 
categories of Higgins components: 
Lower-level components can be used to create identity services such as attribute services, token 
services and relying party Web-sites (i.e., service providers) and services.  
Upper-level components can be used to create user-centric applications which allow the user to 
view, employ and manage his/her various identities (i-cards).  
More specifically, Higgins’ upper-level components can be used to build identity agents which allow 
users to accept i-cards from card issuing sites (i.e., identity providers), they can be used to create 
self-issued cards, manage a user’s set of cards and to use these cards towards service providers 
(relying parties) or local applications.  
The Higgins project has been working on achieving interoperability with Microsoft CardSpace-
compatible card issuing and relying sites (which explains the terminology used) as well as being 
interoperable with OpenID providers and OpenID service providers (see section 0 for more details 
about OpenID).  
Several agent deployment configurations are supported, perhaps most interestingly a Web-based 
identity agent for Internet Explorer and Firefox (on both Windows and Linux). For Firefox, the 
architecture includes an extension similar to that of CardSpace, which will allow users to select i-
cards when authentication is required towards service providers. 
3.2.8 Microsoft Windows CardSpace 
Windows CardSpace [21] is Microsoft’s latest effort on the identity management frontier. The client 
side comes preinstalled with Windows Vista / Windows 7 and it is available through .NET Framework 
upgrades for Windows XP. The solution uses several standards for identity management, among 
them the WS-Trust specification which allows someone to request a security token containing a set 
of claims from an Identity Provider.  
When a user needs to submit personal information to a CardSpace enabled Web-site, the website 
will demand a set of claims or a token from the user. The CardSpace application will then appear on 
the user’s screen, and locks the display so that only the CardSpace application is accessible. The user 
then selects a card, either self-issued or managed, which is used to perform the transaction of 
security tokens and personal information.  
The CardSpace architecture consists of Relying Parties (RP), which are service providers and the 
Security Token Service (STS), which resembles what has previously been described as Identity 
Providers. 
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The major drawback with the CardSpace initiative is that it is tightly integrated with Microsoft 
products (Windows Vista and .NET Framework), it is rather complex and not entirely trivial to 
integrate with alternative authentication mechanisms like Smart Cards, biometrics etc. However, as 
the system matures and more documentation is released, the weaknesses of CardSpace will 
hopefully be improved. 
3.2.9 Kerberos 
Kerberos [22] is a secret key-based distributed authentication system, which allows nodes 
communicating over a non-secure network to prove their identity to one another in a secure manner. 
The core of the system is a Key Distribution Center (KDC), which consists of the Authentication Server 
(AS) and a Ticket Granting Server (TGS).  
The Kerberos authentication process is illustrated in Figure 12. The clients tries to log on and start 
authenticating to the AS (1), using a secret key and a challenge-response protocol, and if 
authentication succeeds the AS generates a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) (2). TGT consists of a session 
key encrypted using the client’s secret key and a temporal credential secured using a secret key 
established between the AS and the TGS. The client then presents this ticket to the TGS (3), which 
can verify that the client is authenticated and can issue further tickets for other services (4). Tickets 
granted for a service are (5) secured using a symmetric key between TGS and the service requested. 
The service in question can verify the validity of issued tickets (6 and 7). And finally the service 
establishes a session for the client (8). 
 
Figure 12 Kerberos authentication 
Windows 2000 and later use Kerberos as the default authentication method. Several other operating 
systems also support Kerberos for authentication of users or services. Kerberos requires continuous 
availability, or users will be denied login. Kerberos is further vulnerable to clock synchronization 
issues, and as not all aspects of the protocol are fully standardized, different implementations may 
not be fully compatible. 
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3.2.10 Generic Bootstrapping Architecture 
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) [23] is a technology enabling the authentication of a 
mobile phone user. Although this is an initiative by the telecom collaboration organization 3GPP, 
they try to solve challenges related to accessing web resources, similar to the more web-centric 
identity frameworks already presented in this section – in a converged communication world of 
mobile phones and IP based services. 
The User Equipment (UE) has a key stored on a 
smartcard. The UE and Bootstrapping function server 
(BSF) mutually authenticate themselves using the 
Digest access authentication AKA protocol. BSF 
retrieves data about the subscriber from the Home 
Subscriber Server (HSS), using the Diameter Base 
Protocol. The service is provided by an application 
server called Network Application Function (NAF). 
After mutually authenticated the user and operator 
agree on session keys which can then be used between 
the client and services that the user wants to 
consume. The GBA authentication process is shown in 
Figure 13. 
For this authentication method there is no need for a user enrolment phase or secure deployment of 
keys, as the mobile phone already is in possession of a key, making this solution favourable to PKI. 
The authentication method is easily integrated into terminals and service providers, as it is based on 
HTTP Digest [24] access authentication (see also section 6.4.1.3). The user device however needs a 
way to access the smartcard (either via Bluetooth SAP or Java or native application) and the HTTP 
browser must implement way to do digest authentication by signing the challenge sent by the BSF. 
  
 
Figure 13 GBA authentication 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 38 
 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 39 
4 Mobile computing 
This chapter first presents the general ideas in mobile computing, such as the concepts of personal 
area networks and ubiquitous computing. Then an introduction to mobile networks technologies 
such as GSM / UMTS and IMS follow. 
4.1 Personal Area Networks (PAN) 
Personal area networks [25] is a kind of computer networks used for communication among 
computing devices, e.g. phones and multimedia players, in proximity to an individual’s body. PAN 
originally used cabled communication, and still is, nowadays using for example USB and FireWire. A 
wireless personal area network (WPAN) can also be made possible with wireless network 
technologies such as for example Bluetooth, Ad hoc Wi-Fi, Ultra Wide Band (UWB) and ZigBee. The 
PAN devices are typically communicating within a few meters, but in addition to communication 
among the personal devices themselves (intrapersonal communication), also connecting to a higher 
level network and the Internet (an uplink) is possible. The devices in a PAN, situated around the user 
should self-organize to form the network and connect to the Internet only requiring minimal user 
configuration efforts. 
4.2 Ubiquitous Computing 
Ubiquitous computing [26] as a term was invented during the late 1980’s at Xerox PARC. It is also 
referred to as pervasive computing [27] and carries a vision of small, inexpensive, robust networked 
processing devices, created in any size or shape, pervading everyday life without anyone taking 
notice of their existence.. Mark Weiser, chief scientist at Xerox PARC proposed three basic forms of 
ubiquitous devices: tabs, pads and boards. Tabs are wearable centimetre sized devices, while pads 
are hand-held decimetre-sized devices and further boards are meter sized interactive display devices. 
Later other forms of ubiquitous devices have been proposed, such as dust, skin and clay. Dust is 
miniaturised devices ranging from nanometres to millimetres in size, while skin is light emitting 
devices such as displays that can painted on a surface, and further clays can be formed into arbitrary 
three dimensional shapes. 
A common example of ubiquitous computing is an interconnection of lighting and environmental 
controls with personal biometric monitors woven into clothes in such a way that lights and 
temperature in a room would be continuously and imperceptible adjusted. 
Ubiquitous computing is by Alan Kay of Apple called the third paradigm of computing [28]. First were 
mainframes, each shared by lots of people. Now we are in the personal computing or desktop era, 
each person has their own computer. Next comes ubiquitous computing, or the age of calm 
technology, when technology recedes into the background of our lives. 
4.3 Mobile networks 
This chapter presents the technologies used in different kinds of mobile networks, with a focus on 
the different authentication schemes. First GSM/UTMS networks and their components are 
presented. Then the different kinds of SIM authentication architectures are presented, such as GSM / 
UMTS, IMS and Early IMS authentication. Finally hybrid security solutions such as multi-channel 
communication are presented as a way to improve on the already presented authentication 
schemes. 
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4.3.1 GSM/UMTS networks 
This section provides an overview [29] of the GSM and UMTS mobile networks. 
GSM (Global System for Mobile 
communication) is a second generation 
(2G) wireless mobile network standard. 
It was first implemented in 1991, and is 
a widely adopted and widespread 
mobile standard, supporting speech 
and signalling traffic. GPRS is an 
intermediate step towards 3G mobile, 
often called 2.5G. It is packet-based 
and designed to work in parallel with 
GSM. Third generation (3G) wireless 
mobile networks are a convergence of 
various second generation standards. 
Wideband CDMA (W-CDMA) and 
CDMA2000 are third generation 
standards, and especially W-CDMA is 
compatible with GSM.  
The main components of mobile 
networks are shown in Figure 14. A 
mobile phone, called Mobile Station (MS), is composed of a Mobile Equipment (ME) and a Subscriber 
Identity Module (SIM) for 2G and Universal SIM (USIM) for 3G. The Base Station Subsystem (BSS) for 
2G or Radio Network Service (RNS) for 3G controls the radio link with the MS. The second generation 
BSS is composed of several Base Transceiver Stations (BTSs) and a Base Station Controller (BSC).  In 
third generation networks, Node B is comparable to the BTS and Radio Network Controller (RNC) is 
comparable to the BSC in 2G wireless networks. The core network in the packet-switched domain 
consists of the same components for both 2G and 3G wireless networks; Serving GPRS Support Node 
(SGSN) and Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN).  The GGSN is responsible for the interworking 
between the GPRS network and external packet switched networks, like the Internet and X.25 
networks. The MSC is a part of the Network Sub-System (NSS) along with the Visitor Location 
Register (VLR), Home Location Register (HLR) and Authentication Centre (AuC).  In third generation 
networks, Home Subscriber Server (HSS) corresponds to both HLR and AuC in 2G wireless networks. 
The VLR has information about the active subscribers in its network. The MSC is coordinating and 
setting up calls to and from Mobile Stations. Signalling System Number 7 (SS7) is a set of telephony 
signalling protocols, and is used to pass signalling messages between MSC and HLR/HSS.  In the 
context of this thesis, the Core Network and the connection to Public Switched Telephone Network 
(PSTN) are not relevant and will not be discussed. 
4.3.2 SIM authentication architectures 
A Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) [30] is a part of a removable smart card ICC (Integrated Circuit 
Card), also known as SIM cards. The use of SIM cards is mandatory in GSM devices, has been around 
for several decades and is also used for a range of other – mostly telecom related – applications. SIM 
cards are used to authenticate when a mobile phone is logging on to the mobile operator’s network. 
There are several SIM based authentication schemes as presented in the next subsections. 
 
Figure 14 The main components of mobile networks 
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4.3.2.1 GSM and UMTS authentication 
Authentication in GSM and UMTS mobile networks [31][32][33] is based on a challenge-response 
mechanism. First let’s describe the traditional authentication schemes of SIM. During the 
Authentication process the terminal obtains the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) from 
the SIM card, and passes this to the mobile operator requesting access and authentication. The 
operator network searches its HLR/AuC-database for the incoming IMSI and its associated 
Authentication Key (Ki). The Ki is a 128-bit key previously assigned by the operator during a 
personalization process. 
The operator network then generates a Random Number (RAND) and signs it with the Ki associated 
with the IMSI (and stored on the SIM card), computing another number known as Signed Response 
(SRES_1). The operator network then sends the RAND to the terminal, which passes it to the SIM 
card. The SIM card signs it with its Ki, producing SRES_2 which it gives to the terminal along with 
Encryption Key (Kc). The terminal passes SRES_2 on to the operator network.  
The operator network then compares its 
computed SRES_1 with the computed SRES_2 
that the terminal returned to verify the 
authenticity of the SIM. If the two numbers 
match the SIM is authenticated and the 
terminal is granted access to the operator’s 
network. The Kc is then used to encrypt all 
further communications between the terminal 
and the network. 
Authentication in UMTS mobile networks is similar to authentication in GSM mobile network, though 
USIM is used instead of SIM, and the HSS-database is searched instead of the HLR/AuC-database. 
Figure 15 shows the input and outputs of the GSM A3 and GSM A8 algorithms (A8 is for generating 
encryption keys). 
4.3.2.2 IMS authentication 
The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is an architectural framework for delivering internet protocol (IP) 
multimedia to mobile users. It was originally designed by the wireless standards body 3
rd
 Generation 
Partnership Project (3GPP), and is part of the vision for evolving mobile networks beyond GSM. IMS 
is intended to aid the access of multimedia and voice applications across wireless and wired 
terminals, i.e. aid a form of fixed mobile convergence. 
The UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card) is a smart card similar to the U/SIM cards, and is used in 
mobile terminals in GSM and UMTS networks to support IMS. An IP Multimedia Services Identity 
Module (ISIM) came with the UMTS release 5, is an application running on a UICC card in a 3G mobile 
phone and is required for the IMS to function. This new application ISIM was specified for supporting 
the additional security requirements of IMS (e.g. for identity management and authentication). 
However, since the adoption and deployment of ISIM by mobile operators is expected to take a 
while, other alternatives for authentication have been specified as well, such as Early IMS. 
4.3.2.3 Early IMS authentication 
Early IMS [34] might be used in IMS implementations that do not yet support all IMS requirements. 
The early IMS security works by creating a secure binding in the HSS between the public/private user 
 
Figure 15 Input and output of GSM algorithms 
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identity and the IP address currently allocated to the user at the GPRS level (bearer/network level 
identity). Therefore, IMS level signalling, and especially the IMS identities claimed by a user, can be 
connected securely to the Packet Switched domain bearer level security context. 
The GGSN terminates each user’s packet data protocol (PDP) (e.g. IP, X.25 or Frame Relay) context 
and has assurance that the IMSI used within this PDP context is authenticated. The GGSN shall 
provide the user’s IP address, IMSI and MSISDN (phone number bound to the SIM card) to a RADIUS 
server in the HSS over the Gi interface when a PDP context is activated towards the IMS system. The 
HSS has a binding between the IMSI and / or MSISDN and the IP Multimedia Private Identity (IMPI) 
and IP Multimedia Public Identity (IMPU), and is therefore able to store the currently assigned IP 
address from the GGSN against the user’s IMPI and/or IMPU(s). The GGSN informs the HSS when the 
PDP context is deactivated / modified so that the stored IP address can be updated in the HSS. 
4.3.3 Hybrid security solutions 
Multi-channel communication [35] is a way to improve the security of an authentication scheme. By 
communicating using several channels both man-in-the-middle and eavesdropping attacks are much 
harder to accomplish since the attacker must control all the utilized channels.  
When doing communication over a wireless channel, you can never be sure whether you are talking 
to the expected device or to any other compatible device within range. Doing a Diffie-Hellman 
exchange over a wireless channel gives no guarantees about the party with which one is establishing 
a key, and thus the process is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack. 
If there is an extra channel between the devices, such as one device has a display and the other a 
keypad, the extra channel can be used to transfer bits from the first to the second device that can go 
into the key exchange protocol. It is impractical to read a display and type a sufficient long code on a 
keypad over this extra channel. A long code would be both tedious and prone to errors, so a shorter 
code is often preferred. A short code, e.g. 48-bit or less, could as [36] shows allow an eavesdropper 
to carry out a brute force attack finding an alternative code (with the same hash) making the key 
exchange valid. 
If instead one device has a screen and the other a camera, a suitable graphical encoding may be used 
to transfer bits from the first to the second device over a visual channel. Providing the greater 
capacity on a visual channel, a larger code can be transferred making the key exchange sufficient 
secure. 
In [38], a multi-channel authentication scheme using a mobile phone is demonstrated. Two channels 
are used for authentication. First a challenge is sent by SMS from the authentication server to the 
mobile phone using the GSM network. Then an OTP is returned through a secure Internet connection 
to the authentication server. The OTP is generated from a hash of a concatenation of the challenge 
and a secret key in possession by both the mobile phone and the authentication server. 
The basic principle of multi-channel mobile authentication is sometimes referred to as the closed 
loop principle. This is explained next. 
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4.3.3.1 Closed loop principle 
A basic principle when designing an 
authentication scheme which involves 
several different devices communicating 
across different networks is to ensure 
that it is the same user that controls all 
involved devices. This can be 
accomplished by applying a “closed loop” 
where communication pass through all 
the components involved in the 
authentication (see Figure 16). The loop 
starts in the device requesting the 
service, a service consumer (e.g. PC), 
goes through the service provider, then a 
mobile phone and finally back to the PC. 
The communication-loop spans across 
different networks, such as GSM 
network, The Internet and Bluetooth 
network. 
Using the mobile phone and OTP tokens to realize a closed loop is shown in [38]. 
A SIM-based authentication scheme can be used when authenticating to other services, and could 
apply to the following set-ups / scenarios: 
• A mobile phone with a SIM and Bluetooth placed close to a Bluetooth enabled PC 
• A mobile phone with a SIM and SMS service 
• A USB dongle (with a SIM card reader) mounted on the PC 
• A GPRS/3G PC card (with a SIM) installed on the PC 
As this section discusses, multi-channel communication could improve the security of an 
authentication scheme, and the mobile phone provides a range of several different communication 
channels that might be used to provide multi-channel authentication. 
  
 
Figure 16 Closed loop principle of mobile authentication for services 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 44 
 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 45 
5 State-of-the-art service provisioning 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the state-of-the-art service provisioning of today, namely the widely adopted 
cloud computing concept and its current service models. As will be presented in more detail later, 
cloud computing is a way of standardizing typical resources such as hardware and network capacity 
in a way such that the actual services running on top of these resources are the interesting and not 
the resources facilitating those services. In chapter 7 the personal cloud is introduced, creating a 
parallel from cloud computing into the personal domain. Thus, this introduction of cloud computing 
is required input to later chapters and the respective contributions. 
5.2 Cloud computing 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) definition [39], cloud 
computing has these three essential characteristics:  
1. The service is fully managed by the provider – the consumer needs nothing but a personal 
computer and Internet access.  
2. It is elastic – a user can have as much or as little of a service as they want at any given time. 
Resource use is optimized by metering usage – can be monitored, controlled, and reported.  
3. It is sold on demand – typically by the minute or the hour.   
According to NIST, cloud computing is also: 
“…a concept and a paradigm shift whereby details are abstracted from the end-users who no 
longer need knowledge of, expertise in, or control over the technology infrastructure “in the 
cloud” that supports them”. 
At Wikipedia.org, cloud computing is defined as: 
“…a style of computing in which dynamically scalable and often virtualized resources are provided 
as a service over the Internet.” 
The NIST definition is vague when it comes to what is abstracted away from what, and service access 
is limited to personal computers with Internet access (not considering other computing devices like 
mobile phones, and not considering other types of networks like Local Area Networks). The 
Wikipedia.org definition is not clear in the vision regarding what resources can be provided as 
services through the cloud. According to [40], a cloud consists of the hardware and software that 
make up the data centres that provide services according to the Software as a Service concept. 
However, they differentiate between the actual SaaS and the inherent service of the cloud itself (the 
software and hardware making up the data centre); the latter they refer to as utility computing. 
The following definition is proposed and adopted throughout this thesis: 
“Cloud computing is a concept where any type of computing resource can be exposed as a 
service, and where service access is agnostic of the service’s location (geographical and logical), 
its runtime platform, the service provider and the underlying technology of the resource providing 
the service.” 
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The properties listed as part of this definition are important if cloud computing is going to improve 
anything for the end-users. For example, ensuring that access to a service is provider-independent is 
important to prevent lock-in (which is a concern pointed out by amongst others Richard Stallman 
[40]). The definition also takes care of necessary abstraction, due to layering and location 
independence.   
In the Merriam-Webster dictionary a resource is defined as: 
“A source of supply or support.” 
However, to be useful in a cloud computing context, a resource must also be identifiable through 
what kind of supply or support it is a source of. Therefore resource is proposed to be defined as: 
“A resource is a source of supply or support where the type of supply and support is 
distinguishable among other resources.” 
In the cloud computing context, a service is proposed to be defined as: 
“A service is a well-defined interface towards a resource; it defines the type of resource it is an 
interface towards, the required inputs and the provided outputs.” 
Note that these definitions are not formal and not meant to be used in e.g. a service discovery phase. 
They are provided to have a common ground of reasoning about, and discussion of, cloud computing. 
By the provided definition of cloud computing, any resource already provided access to through 
computing devices could be exposed as a service. Many adopters of the cloud computing concept 
consider core hardware (e.g. processing, storage, memory, communication) as the major resource to 
provide access to. However, our definition does not discriminate the type of resource and supports 
an ultimate vision of cloud computing being a completely service oriented environment where 
consumers have maximum flexibility in the service acquisition and usage process. 
5.3 Service models 
Bearing in mind the introduced definition of cloud computing, resources and services, it is clear that 
resources can be of different types. It is common to refer to the categorization of resources as 
different service provisioning models. Commonly, literature on cloud computing [41] defines three 
service models as follows:  
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
• Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
• Software as a Service (SaaS) 
 
Figure 17 illustrates the much-used ontology of cloud computing, with characteristics, service models 
and deployment models. 
5.3.1  Infrastructure as a Service 
Infrastructure as a service like Amazon Web Services provides virtual server instances with unique IP 
addresses and blocks of storage on demand. Customers use the provider’s application program 
interface (API) to start, stop, access and configure their virtual servers and storage. In the enterprise, 
cloud computing allows a company to pay for only as much capacity as is needed, and bring more 
online as soon as required. Because this pay-for-what-you-use model resembles the way electricity, 
fuel and water are consumed; it’s sometimes referre
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5.3.2 Platform as a Service 
Platform as a Service in the cloud is defined as a set of software and product development tools 
hosted on the provider’s infrastructure. Developers create applications on the provider’s platform 
over the Internet. PaaS providers may use APIs, web-site portals or gateway software installed on the 
customer’s computer. Google App Engine and Force.com, (originating from Salesforce) are examples 
of PaaS. There may be lack of standards for interoperability or data portability, making it difficult to 
move software off the provider’s platform. 
5.3.3 Software as a Service 
In the software as a service cloud model, the vendor supplies the hardware infra-structure, the 
software product and interacts with the user through a front-end portal. SaaS is a very broad market. 
Services can be anything from web-based email to rich customer relationship management (CRM) 
solutions. Since the service provider hosts both application and data, the service may be used from 
anywhere. 
5.4 Deployment models 
The scope of the “cloud” in cloud computing may differ, or the cloud may assume different 
compositions and internal architectures. The cloud may span one or several physical and/or logical 
networks. It is common to describe the various scopes of cloud computing by dividing the concept 
into four deployment models: 
Private cloud - The cloud infrastructure is operated only for a single organization, and the 
organization itself or a third party could manage it. It is either located on site or off site. 
Public cloud - The cloud infrastructure is made available to the general public or a large industry 
group and is owned by an organization selling cloud services. 
 
Figure 17 The essential characteristics, service models and deployment models of cloud computing 
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Hybrid cloud - The cloud infrastructure is composed by two or more clouds (private, community or 
public). The clouds in the composition remain unique but are simultaneously bound together in a 
way that enables data and application portability. 
Community cloud - The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations and supports a specific 
community that share concerns (e.g. when considering mission, security requirements, policy and 
compliance). The organizations itself or a third party may manage it, and it is either located on site or 
off site. 
 
Figure 18 illustrates the major 
deployment models for cloud 
computing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Cloud computing enablers 
As stated, cloud computing is 
merely a concept, and it 
depends on enablers and 
technologies to be realised. 
Figure 19 shows the stack of 
service models where layers are 
dependent of the layers below.  
This section will describe 
enablers for each of the service 
models. 
5.5.1 Enablers for IaaS 
The enablers for IaaS (Figure 20) are typically a cloud 
platform on top of hardware resources. The 
important hardware components to consider are the 
processing unit (CPU), volatile storage (memory) and 
persistent storage (disk). The cloud platform is usually 
an advanced virtualization platform with some 
supporting tools for administration and management. 
The virtualization technology behind IaaS in cloud 
computing allows the sharing of the underlying 
physical machine resources between different virtual 
machines, each running its own operating system.  
 
Figure 18 Industry-recognized cloud computing deployment models 
 
Figure 19 Different service models 
 
Figure 20 Enablers for Infrastructure as a Service 
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5.5.1.1 Virtualization 
The software layer providing the virtualization is called a virtual machine monitor or hypervisor. A 
hypervisor can either run on bare hardware (native VM) or on top of an operating system (hosted 
VM). Recently, CPU vendors have added hardware virtualization assistance to their products.  
The main contenders – Citrix with Xen, VMware, Red Hat and Microsoft – has all recently added 
cloud platform offerings. The cloud platforms often support standard data formats for complete 
virtual machines including the current state of a running machine, which makes it easier to move 
virtual machines between different platforms. Many of these cloud platforms also support 
management of virtual machines using a web interface.  
Xen – XenSource was founded to support the development of the open source project. The first 
public release of Xen occurred in 2003. Citrix Systems acquired XenSource in October. Late in 2009 
they launched the initiative Xen Cloud Platform (XCP). XCP contains a set of tools, to extend the 
capability of the hypervisor as a cloud computing platform. E.g. Amazon’s and RackSpace’s cloud 
offerings are heavily tied to the Xen platform. 
VMware – Founded in 1998 and is a provider of virtualization software. Their commercial products 
had until recently lagged behind in the cloud space compared to Xen’s offerings. But late in 2009 
VMware has launched the vCloud Express initiative targeted for cloud computing. vCloud Express is 
an IaaS offering delivered by VMware service provider partners, and it supposed to make it easy to 
move corporate VMware virtual computers into the cloud. 
Kernel-based Virtual Machine – Linux KVM is a full virtualization solution for Linux, which first was 
included in Linux 2.6.20 (February 2007). It consists of a loadable kernel module, that provides the 
core virtualization infrastructure and with processor specific modules. After acquiring Qumranet in 
2008, Red Hat has been the main sponsor behind the KVM development and is expected to be a 
significant contender among the cloud platform offerings. Red Hat announced in November 2009 its 
Enterprise Virtualization for Servers and is an end-to-end virtualization solution. 
Microsoft – Their hypervisor is called Hyper-V. Microsoft Hyper-V Server 2008 R2 can handle new 
CPU features by Intel and AMD that will boost performance. Microsoft’s System Center Virtual Ma-
chine Manager (VMM) 2008 R2 can manage both its own hypervisor as well as VM-ware’s hypervisor, 
and will in later versions also handle Xen. Microsoft has put a PaaS cloud service offering, namely 
Windows Azure, into production in the beginning of 2010. 
5.5.2 Enablers for PaaS 
The enablers for PaaS are a combination of 
hardware, a cloud platform and connectivity to 
Internet. Connectivity is often measured in 
bandwidth and the global location can also have an 
impact. A cloud provider typically offers a 
combination of these and other services. The 
additional services offered by a cloud provider 
might vary, but are often management and 
administration tools, APIs for automation, pools of 
readymade images of guest operating systems. A 
cloud provider may also optionally offer higher level 
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services like storage services (file storage / database storage) normally considered an enabler for 
SaaS. Figure 21 shows these enablers for PaaS. 
5.5.3 Enablers for SaaS 
Figure 22 shows the commonly described enablers for software as a service. We will in this section 
describe common technologies, such as storage facilities and platform middleware that enables SaaS 
in the cloud. 
5.5.3.1 Storage facilities 
Most software solutions need fundamental storage 
facilities as file storage and database storage. Many cloud 
providers provide such platform services, yet others only 
provide infrastructure where you are free to install a guest 
operating system with an appropriate software stack, e.g. 
LAMP (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP). 
File storage – Amazon provides unlimited storage from its 
Simple Storage Service (S3) file storage service, 
manageable through a web services interface. S3 was 
publicly available in March 2006 and claims to use the 
same scalable storage infrastructure its own global e-
commerce service and promises 99.9% uptime guarantee. 
Customers are charged for the storage occupied and 
bandwidth consumed per month. Google’s search engine 
generates enormous amount of data. To store all this data, Google created the proprietary BigFiles, 
later grown into a distributed file system called Google File System (GFS), and Google offers this as a 
file storage service for others to use. 
Database storage – For storage of large amounts of structured information, there is a move from 
relational databases towards structured storage databases, also often called NoSQL databases [44]. 
This database technology has been embraced by cloud platform providers. Examples are Amazon 
SimpleDB and Google’s BigTable database services. The latter builds upon GFS for its underlying 
storage, is a compressed, high performance, and proprietary database system. Google offers access 
to it as part of their Google App Engine. Microsoft SQL Azure is a cloud-based relational database 
service built on SQL Server technologies. Microsoft provides its SQL Azure database service as a part 
of their Windows Azure platform. 
5.5.3.2 Supporting frameworks 
The platform middleware usually consists of various different supporting frameworks, depending on 
what kind of platform in question. Each platform, e.g. Java, .NET, has a lot of libraries and basis 
functionality included. There frameworks usually add up, solving common problems according to 
familiar patterns and practices. Examples could be database frameworks such as Hibernate and 
Entity Framework, or more general purpose frameworks such as the Spring Framework and 
Microsoft Enterprise Framework. 
5.6 Mobile cloud computing 
A particular sub-set of cloud computing is mobile cloud computing [67]. This particular concept within 
cloud computing considers the case where mobile devices offload resource intensive operations to 
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the cloud according to the service-oriented computing concept. For the constraint of computing 
ability of portable devices, the cloud computing is suitable for the mobile environment. Mobile cloud 
has been proposed to solve this constraint. With mobile cloud, users just need to send their requests 
for a certain service and the cloud provides the service. The mobile host does not need to pay much 
computing time for complex services. The advantage of cloud computing is brought to the mobile 
environment with this architecture. 
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6 Service personalization 
In chapter 5, cloud computing was presented as it is perceived in the market and has also provided 
some definitions trying to embrace the ultimate goal of cloud computing. In chapter 7, cloud 
computing for individuals is proposed, and in this chapter some required technological building 
blocks preparing for the personal cloud are presented. 
6.1 Interconnecting networks 
The personal domain spans different networks and consists of resources located in different 
networks, such as networks at home, workplace and holiday house. Those networks could be LANs 
behind NAT-routers/firewalls. The 
networks should be able to 
interconnect by securely 
circumventing the obstacles 
introduced by routers and firewalls. 
Figure 23 shows the common NAT 
router / firewall scenario, and we 
seek to find a way for the networks 
in Location 1 and Location 2 to 
interconnect. 
Here are some technologies and standards, which strive to achieve this goal: 
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) – UPnP is a set of networking protocols specified by the UPnP Forum. 
The goals of UPnP are to allow devices to connect seamlessly and to simplify the implementation of 
networks in the home (data sharing, communications, and entertainment) and in corporate 
environments for simplified installation of computer components. The UPnP protocol, as default, 
does not implement any end-user authentication, so UPnP device implementations must implement 
their own authentication mechanisms, or implement the Device Security Service. There also exists a 
non-standard solution called UPnP-UP (UPnP User Profile) which proposes an extension to allow user 
authentication and authorization mechanisms for UPnP devices and applications. UPnP can partially 
support the functionality required for service and device discovery. 
The different networks where the personal resources are scattered needs to be interconnected. To 
support NAT traversal, UPnP has implemented the Internet Gateway Device (IGD) Protocol. Routers 
and firewalls running the UPnP IGD protocol are vulnerable to attack since the designers of the IGD 
implementation omitted a standard authentication method.  
To summarize, UPnP has focus on limited scope private networks (i.e., LANs), lacks the required 
intrinsic security features that must be in place for a broader service platform, has no concept of 
individual users (all users connected to the same network can in theory share all services) and does 
not handle service discovery in a trusted, globally distributed way. UPnP is therefore not likely to 
become the preferred technology for achieving a globally distributed, trusted and personalized 
service platform consisting of an end-user’s devices.  
Digital Living Network Alliance (DLNA) – DLNA is a standard used by manufacturers of consumer 
electronics to allow entertainment devices within the home to share their content with each other 
across a home network. DLNA specifications are not open, however, being based on UPnP, DLNA has 
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inherited most of the limitations. In addition, DLNA only supports a sub-set of the functionality of 
UPnP, both for transport (content types) as well as for signalling. 
Zero configuration networking (zeroconf) [42] – ZeroConf is a set of techniques that automatically 
creates a usable Internet Protocol (IP) network without manual operator intervention or special 
configuration servers. Zeroconf’s three core technologies are link-local address autoconfiguration, 
automatic resolution and distribution of hostnames (multicast DNS) and automatic location of 
network services through DNS service discovery.  
Devices Profile for Web Services (DPWS) [43] – DPWS defines a minimal set of implementation 
constraints to enable secure Web Service messaging, discovery, description, and eventing on 
resource-constrained devices. Its objectives are similar to those of Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) 
but, in addition, DPWS is fully aligned with Web Services technology and includes numerous 
extension points allowing for seamless integration of device-provided services in enterprise-wide 
application scenarios. The specifications of DPWS are general – as a sub-set of Web Services 
standards – and they are not tied to specific services. DPWS is designed for limited scope networks 
like LANs, and does not adopt the directory based discovery protocol (UDDI) of XML Web Services. 
Instead it relies on WS-Discovery, which is based on multicast for dynamic discovery. Being designed 
for LANs, the specifications do not in themselves consider NAT traversal challenges and support for 
it. 
Windows Rally – The Windows Rally program, formerly called Windows Connect Now (WCN), 
provides access to Microsoft technology, licensing and technical guidance for hardware 
manufacturers, software developers, and service providers who want to use a common platform for 
device connectivity.  
6.2 Discovery and service directory 
To locate any type of service, independent of its technical realisation, it must be possible to refer to 
it, and acquire access to it, by either its name or type. It is thus a need for service definitions, 
directories, and mechanisms to lookup services and to exchange metadata about services. Since XML 
Web Services and its affiliated proto-cols are the commonly adopted technology for realising Service-
Oriented Architectures (SOA), we discuss discovery and directory in relation to these standards. 
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) [45][46] is a platform-independent, XML-
based registry for businesses worldwide to list themselves on the Internet. UDDI is designed to be 
interrogated by SOAP-messages and to provide access to Web Services Description Language (WSDL) 
documents describing the protocol bindings and message formats required to interact with the web 
services listed in its directory. The major limitations of WSDL has been that only syntax can be 
described; however, there has been some work with extending WSDL with semantic capabilities. As 
UDDI registries (v2 or v3) provide very limited means for auto-mated service discovery, there are 
initiatives such as SAWSDL [47] (Semantic Annotations for WSDL Working Group, W3C) and FUSION 
[48] (an EU-funded research project), both which seek to provide unambiguous, semantically rich 
representations of Web service capabilities. 
WS-Policy [49] is a specification that allows web services to use XML to advertise their policies (on 
security, Quality of Service, etc.) WS-Policy represents a set of specifications that describe the 
capabilities and constraints of the security (and other business) policies on intermediaries and end 
points (for example, required security tokens, supported encryption algorithms, and privacy rules). 
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WS-MetaDataExchange [50] is a Web Services specification. It is part of the WS-Federation roadmap 
and is designed to work in conjunction with WS-Addressing, WSDL and WS-Policy to allow retrieval of 
metadata about a Web Services endpoint. 
Web Services Dynamic Discovery (WS-Discovery) [51] is a specification that de-fines a multicast 
discovery protocol to locate services on a local network. WS-Discovery and more recent standard 
proposals such as WS-Inspection and Microsoft’s DISCO is also only intended to discover web services 
on the local network. Although not suitable for all deployment models of cloud computing, it is 
definitely suitable for the personal cloud deployment model proposed in this thesis. 
6.3 Secure data and file storage 
To protect personal data and ensure proper data confidentiality and privacy, personal services could 
benefit from some kind of encrypted and secure database and / or file storage. To achieve high 
availability and avoid loss of valuable data, a personal data storage service could benefit from being 
both distributed and replicated. 
6.3.1 Encryption and privacy 
Some XML standard promoting data confidentiality and privacy: 
XML Encryption – Specification by W3C [52] that defines how to encrypt the contents of an XML 
element. 
Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) – A protocol developed by W3C [53] allowing websites to declare 
their intended use of information they collect about browsing users. It was designed to give users 
more control of their personal information when browsing. 
6.3.2 Storage solutions 
In section 5.5.3.1 there are examples of storage facilities provided by cloud platform providers. In the 
personal sphere, there are similar needs for file storage and structured storage.  
Distributed file storage – An example which might suit the personal needs of file storage is XtreemFS. 
XtreemFS is a distributed and replicated file system for the Internet, fit for providing storage in cloud 
computing. 
Structured storage – There is a move towards structured storage databases. Structured storage 
databases also make sense for personal data storage, as they may store any kind of structured data 
and work well together with established web standards. Examples are Apache CouchDB and 
MongoDB, both heavily tied to web technologies, e.g. javascript, HTTP/REST and JSON. CouchDB has 
a replication service with a local copy of data, allowing using it even on slow or unreliable 
connections which make data-sharing difficult. Once connection restored the changes will replicate 
back to the main database with automatic conflict- detection and management. 
6.4 Personalized services 
This chapter present standards and technologies necessary for providing various services to the user. 
The presented material provides background information for case studies of personalized services, 
such as VoIP telephony (SIP) and Virtual Private Network (VPN), presented in later chapters. 
6.4.1 Session Initiation Protocol 
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) was originally designed by Henning Schulzrinne and Mark 
Handley. Since the start in 1996, the latest version of the specification is RFC 3261 [54]. SIP is a 
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signalling protocol, generally used for controlling multimedia communication sessions such as voice 
and video calls over IP. The protocol can for instance be used for creating, modifying and terminating 
sessions between two parties (unicast) or among multiple parties (multicast) consisting of one or 
more media streams. IMS, presented in section 4.3.2.2, is based on SIP. 
SIP authentication – SIP bases its authentication solutions on those used for HTTP. In previous 
versions of the standard, HTTP Basic was allowed as one authentication mechanism. However, the 
more recent standards require at least HTTP Digest or stronger.  
A Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) mechanism has been specified to use in 
SIP for encryption. S/MIME can also be used to digitally sign a SIP message. However S/MIME is 
dependent upon a Certificate Authority (CA) and accompanying Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and 
therefore limited by the adoption of such a system. 
6.4.1.1 SIP architecture 
The two fundamental components that are used by the SIP are User agents, which are endpoints of a 
call (i.e., each of the participants in a call), and SIP servers, which are computers on the network that 
service requests from clients, and send back responses. The main components as shown in Figure 24 
are: 
User agents – Both parties (the computer that is 
being used to make a call, and the target 
computer that is being called) are user agents, 
and these make the two endpoints of the 
communication session. There are two kinds of 
user agents: a client and a server.  
The user agent making a request (initiating a 
session) is the User Agent Client (UAC), while the 
user agent responding to the request is the User 
Agent Server (UAS). In distinction from HTTP, the 
parties in a SIP switch being clients and servers 
throughout a SIP session, as both sides can initiate requests to the other. User agents are required 
for a SIP session to be established. 
SIP servers - Used to resolve usernames to IP addresses, so that requests sent from one user agent to 
another can be routed properly. A user agent registers with the SIP server, providing the username 
and current IP where it can be reached. This also informs the agent’s online status, making it 
available for requests. Because a user agent usually don’t know the IP address of another user agent, 
a request is made to the SIP server to invite another user into a session. The SIP server then identifies 
whether the person is currently online, and uses the username to lookup the IP address. 
The SIP server may have any of these roles: Registrar server, Proxy server, Redirect server. 
Registrar Server - Used to register the location of a user agent who has logged onto the network by 
associating the username with the IP-address. This creates a directory of online users, and when 
someone wishes to establish a session with one of these users, the Registrar server’s information is 
used to identify the IP addresses of those involved in the session. 
 
Figure 24 SIP architecture 
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Proxy Server - Forwards requests on behalf of other computers. When a SIP server receives a request 
from a client, the request can be forwarded to another SIP server on the network. A proxy server can 
provide functions as network access control, security, authentication and authorization. 
Redirect Server - Redirects clients to the user agent they are attempting to contact. When user agent 
makes a request, the Redirect server can respond with the IP address of the user agent being 
contacted. This differs from a Proxy server, which forwards the request on your behalf. The Redirect 
server instead tells you to contact them yourself. The Redirect server also has the ability split the call 
making it ring at several locations. 
When user agents communicate directly, sending requests and responses to each other without 
intervening servers, they form a peer-to-peer-network. However, as most user agents are behind 
firewalls, they usually have to involve SIP servers, resulting in client/server architecture. 
6.4.1.2 SIP signalling 
SIP is based on the request-response paradigm, sending and interpreting textual commands, similar 
to HTTP except that the parties in a SIP switch being clients and servers throughout a SIP session. 
The commands in a SIP request are called methods (Table 5): 
SIP Method Description 
INVITE Invites a user to a call 
ACK Used to facilitate reliable message exchange for INVITEs 
BYE Terminates a connection between users or declines a call 
CANCEL Terminates a request, or search, for a user 
OPTIONS Solicits information about a server’s capabilities 
REGISTER Registers a user’s current location 
INFO Used for mid-session signalling 
Table 5 SIP methods 
SIP responses closely resemble HTTP responses (Table 6): 
Code Description 
1xx Informational (e.g. 100 Trying, 180 Ringing) 
2xx Successful (e.g. 200 OK, 202 Accepted) 
3xx Redirection (e.g. 302 Moved Temporarily) 
4xx Request Failure (e.g. 404 Not Found, 482 Loop Detected) 
5xx Server Failure (e.g. 501 Not Implemented) 
6xx Global Failure (e.g. 603 Decline)  
Table 6 SIP response codes 
6.4.1.3 SIP security functions 
For authentication, SIP use HTTP Digest, and HTTP Digest is based on MD5 cryptographic hashing: 
MD5 [55] – Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5) is a widely used cryptographic hash, MD5 has been 
employed in a wide variety of security applications, and is also commonly used to check the integrity 
of files.  
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HTTP Digest [24] – An access authentication method used to negotiate credentials, based on 
challenge-response. Digest authentication is intended to supersede unencrypted use of the Basic 
access authentication, allowing user identity to be 
established securely without having to send a 
password in plaintext over the network. Digest 
authentication is based on MD5 cryptographic 
hashing with usage of nonce values (nonce – 
number used once) to prevent replay attacks.  
While HTTP Digest was first used for the web 
(using the HTTP protocol), it later found its 
application in the SIP protocol.  
The HTTP Digest algorithm, shown in Figure 25, 
has some input values (username, realm, 
password, method and digest URI), and calculates 
MD5 hash values in several cycles. In one cycle, a 
nonce is inserted, and finally ends with a response 
value. The nonce is a server generated challenge.  
6.4.2 VPN 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) solutions are used to establish a secure communication channel 
between different networks, or between a user and a specific network (e.g. the enterprise network), 
from remote locations. The secure channel is typically established across a public network, usually 
the Internet. After the establishment of a VPN connection, hosts on one of the networks will 
understand hosts on the other network 
as part of the same Local Area Network 
(LAN). Thus communication between 
users and service access will be 
experienced as if they were local. A 
special configuration often referred to 
as “road-warrior” is commonly used by 
employees to remotely access their 
enterprise network, and their computer (e.g. laptop) will become part of the same sub-network as 
the enterprise network upon successful connection, i.e., the computer will get a local address. 
There are two major VPN architectures: 
• Network-to-network (site-to-site) – 
Usually used to unify geographically 
distributed network sites of an 
enterprise (e.g. its branch offices) 
(Figure 26). 
• Road-warrior (remote access) – Usually 
used for employees to connect to their 
enterprise network from remote 
locations, e.g., from home (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 25 HTTP Digest algorithm 
 
Figure 26 Network-to-network VPN 
 
Figure 27 Road-warrior VPN 
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6.4.2.1 VPN security functions 
Every VPN solution must at least include two security functions: 
Authentication – In order to grant access to network resources from remote locations across a public 
network, a VPN solution must include proper authentication mechanisms, i.e., the determination of a 
valid user and his/her access rights. 
Typical authentication mechanisms for VPNs include: 
• Username and password 
• Pre-shared keys 
• Smart Card with PKI 
• One Time Password (OTP) with code generator 
• One Time Password (OTP) with Short Message Service (SMS) 
• Other methods supported through RADIUS/DIAMETER 
 
Many of these authentication mechanisms are common for any service (see section 2.2.2), but 
especially for VPN, many implementations has a tight integration with RADIUS/DIAMETER (see 
section 3.1.3). 
Brief descriptions of some common protocols for authentication in VPNs are now provided: 
IKE [56][57][58] – IPSEC VPN tunnels can be configured statically or established dynamically using 
messages defined by the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) standard. IKE lets two VPN gateways 
authenticate each other, negotiate security parameters, and generate keys for data encryption and 
integrity. IKE uses a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to set up a shared session secret, from which 
cryptographic keys are derived. Public key techniques or, alternatively, a pre-shared key, are used to 
mutually authenticate the communicating parties. 
XAUTH [59] – The authentication methods supported by IKE are a good fit for site-to-site VPNs, but 
IKE does not support asymmetric user authentication methods like passwords, challenge/response 
exchanges and two factor tokens, which are commonly used for remote access. To overcome this, 
many vendors implement non-standard enhancements like XAUTH (Extended Authentication). 
XAUTH is an Internet Draft that supports asymmetric authentication by inserting a new message 
exchange after Main/Aggressive Mode (IKE Phase 1) and before IPSEC parameter negotiation (IKE 
Phase 2). VPN gateways that use XAUTH can prompt remote users for a secondary login. If user login 
succeeds, IPSEC setup continues; otherwise, setup is abandoned. XAUTH – and an improvement 
called Hybrid – are widely implemented in VPN solutions to enable user authentication with “legacy” 
credentials like Windows logins or SecurID tokens. 
PAM [60] – Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) is a mechanism to integrate multiple low-level 
authentication schemes into a high-level API. It allows programs that rely on authentication to be 
written independently of the underlying authentication scheme. 
Encryption – Since communication typically travels across an unsecured, public network, it is 
necessary to use encryption of user data travelling between the two sites (e.g. between the user and 
the enterprise network), in order to provide confidentiality and prohibit eavesdroppers any access to 
the potentially sensitive information sent between the sites. 
Typical protocols for VPNs include: 
IPSEC [61][62] – Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) is a protocol suite for securing IP communications 
by authenticating and encrypting the IP data stream. 
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IPSEC also includes protocols for establishing mutual authentication between agents at the beginning 
of the session and negotiation of cryptographic keys to be used during the session. IPSEC can be used 
to protect data flows site-to-site or remote access to enterprise network. 
SSL/TLS [63] – Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), are 
cryptographic protocols that provide security and data integrity for IP based communications. SSL 
and TLS encrypt the segments of network connections at the Transport Layer end-to-end. The TLS 
protocol is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. TLS provides 
endpoint authentication and communications confidentiality over the Internet using cryptography. 
Utility of TLS – There has been substantial development since the late 1990s in utilizing TLS outside of 
the browser to enable support for client/server applications. For instance TLS can be used to tunnel 
an entire network stack to create a VPN, as is the case with OpenVPN. 
OpenVPN – Is a free and open source VPN system. It is capable of establishing direct links between 
computers across NAT (Network Address Translation) routers and firewalls. OpenVPN offers pre-
shared secret key, certificate-based, and username/password-based authentication. Pre-shared 
secret key is the easiest, with certificate based being the most robust and feature-rich. 
Username/password is a new feature (v2.0) that can be used with or without a client certificate (the 
server still needs a certificate). When compared with traditional IPSEC VPN technologies, TLS has 
some inherent advantages in firewall and NAT traversal that make it easier to administer for large 
remote-access populations. 
6.4.2.2 X.509 authentication 
This section presents the use of ITU-T X.509 certificates [64] for VPN authentication. X.509 is a PKI 
standard for single sign-on and privilege management infrastructure, including specification for one 
of the most common certificate standards.  
Today almost all VPN implementations allow the usage of X.509 certificate for the authentication of 
the peers, and these certificates are the same as used for the implementation of SSL in the HTTP 
protocol. Authentication with X.509 certificates, where each user who wants to connect in VPN 
needs a digital certificate and relevant private key, can be requested with or without authentication 
with username and password. Usually the VPN server has to be configured such that the Certification 
Authority (CA) that signed the certificate has to be in a list of Trusted CAs. Then this CA must be 
authorized to verify access in VPN. 
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7 Personal cloud computing 
In the background partition topics such as Information security, Identity management, Mobile 
computing and Cloud computing have been presented. These topics have discussed building blocks 
and prepared the ground for a new concept proposed by the author of this thesis, which adopts 
features of many other concepts; cloud computing for individuals – The personal cloud (see Figure 
28).  
The personal cloud builds on some of the 
ideas from PAN networks. A PAN is 
typically a limited network consisting of 
devices in close proximity to the user (see 
section 4.1). A personal cloud also 
embraces these devices; however, it may 
also embrace personal devices that are not 
in close (geographical proximity) to the 
user. For example, it may include a device 
(e.g. media server) that resides in a user’s 
apartment, while the user is currently at 
another geographical location (e.g. at work). Both PAN, ad-hoc, and LAN networks has the inherent 
assumption that one user has ownership. However, with the personal cloud, several constellations 
may be created of some of the same devices, but with different ownerships.  
Typically, cloud computing has been embraced by businesses and enterprises, and most value-
propositions have been targeted towards those actors. None of the current cloud deployment 
models cover the personal sphere, individual needs for accessing and processing resources and data 
within homes or remotely away from home. The existing deployment models simply ignore all the 
processing power (CPU/memory) and storage capacity on personal devices like home media servers, 
consoles and mobile phones. In the personal sphere there usually exist large amounts of documents, 
media-files, etc. that should be useful to consume from anywhere, on any personal device. The cloud 
computing concept could also have the potential to bring radically increased value to individuals, and 
very small groups like families, if addressed for the personal needs.  
It is common that people nowadays have numerous computing devices with different capabilities 
(mobile phones, laptops, PCs, cameras, tablet PCs, set-top-boxes etc.). The personal cloud 
deployment model is elaborated to enable users to get maximum benefit from these devices, but 
also to simplify efficient usage of them.  The maximum benefit of a device is only achieved by 
exploiting the added value by having several devices working in collaboration. Figure 29 shows a lot 
of participating computing devices in the personal cloud, scattered around different locations. Some 
of the devices, e.g. the smart phone and laptop, are brought between different locations, and will 
either connect to the local area network (LAN) using Wi-Fi if available or using the cellular network if 
not available. The different locations usually consist of LANs behind NAT-routers/firewalls, and also 
need a way to interconnect. Also, the possibility of temporary inclusion of devices that do not belong 
to the user in question is added (visiting device).  
 
 
Figure 28 Concepts preparing for the personal cloud 
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7.1 Characteristics of the personal cloud 
To exploit the capabilities and power of different devices, it could be useful to combine devices to 
provide composed services. For instance, a tablet PC, with limited processing power, a home server 
with a fast multi-core CPU and lots of processing power, and a file server with huge storage capacity 
could cooperate to form a super charged service taking benefit from capabilities of all three devices. 
There are a lot of high-resolution movies on the file server. The user wants to watch the movies on 
the tablet, but as the tablet has limited resources; it has not enough processing power to decode the 
large amount of data in a high-resolution video stream real-time. It should be possible to utilize 
computing resources from any connected device, thus the processing power of the home server 
should be used for decoding the video-stream and sending the decoded video to the tablet frame by 
frame. 
While talking about devices, the devices 
(D) are only convenient placeholders for 
the services (S) (see Figure 30) running on 
those devices, the same way infrastructure 
and servers are placeholders for services in 
cloud computing. As in cloud computing 
the personal cloud has a focus on services, 
not devices. 
The personal cloud will exploit the potential of combining the resources from all personal computing 
devices, with minimum awareness for the user of how the devices communicate, and where the 
utilized resources actually reside.  
 
Figure 29 Devices participating in the personal cloud 
 
Figure 30 Devices as placeholders for services 
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Figure 31 illustrates that the 
personal clouds embrace both 
local and remote resources. In 
the figure, S represents services 
and MW represents 
middleware. The remote 
resources are provided through 
SaaS providers in the public 
cloud. 
After presenting some initial 
interesting aspects about the 
personal cloud, the personal cloud is summed up as defined by the following characteristics: 
Local access to resources within the personal domain – Personal resources such as services exposed 
by devices should be locally accessible, e.g. among devices connected to the same LAN. Having 
several connected devices working in collaboration will allow for richer services, compound services 
with several participating devices, releasing more potential from any given device. 
Personal domain may span different networks – The personal domain may consist of resources 
located in different networks, such as networks at home, workplace and holiday house. Those 
networks could be LANs behind NAT-routers/firewalls. The networks should be able to interconnect 
by securely circumventing the obstacles introduced by routers and firewalls. This also allows for 
richer compound services with several participating devices, even located in different networks. 
Remote access to personal resources – Personal resources should be accessible from everywhere, e.g. 
when connected to a cellular network or when visiting a guest network, which could be either a 
public Wi-Fi network or a network taking part in some others personal cloud. A user cannot always 
carry the media server to different locations, but it should be of great value having its content 
available for consumption everywhere. 
Personal resources in public cloud could belong to the personal cloud – Personal resources in the 
public cloud, such as personal pictures in an online gallery, could be a part of the personal cloud, 
even if they are located on a remote server. To be exposed in the personal cloud, such services 
should however be wrapped into a service format familiar to the personal cloud. Having the 
possibility to assemble personal services involving resources from online service providers will 
further improve the richness of compound services. 
Personal domain is dynamic and subject to changes in composition – What networks that are 
connected, what devices and services that is included in a personal cloud and how they are allowed 
to communicate may be redefined at any given time. Any service should – given the constraints of 
the current network qualities – be available wherever you are. The same way, it should be possible to 
relocate any personal device and still maintain every compound service, benefiting the user with 
available personal services wherever the user is. 
Resource delegation / shared resources – It must be possible to delegate and share resources to 
other personal clouds, e.g. give access to personal pictures or a Pay TV subscription for presentation 
on a visiting device. As the personal cloud is for individuals having relations to others individuals 
within a society, it will be of great value to be able to share of services with visiting users. If a visiting 
 
Figure 31 Local and remote resources 
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user is not familiar by your personal cloud, establishment of ad-hoc trust would improve the 
flexibility of delegation and sharing. 
User controllable – The user must be in full control of its own personal cloud, and must be able to 
administer it using devices taking part of the user’s personal cloud. The user should be able to setup 
sharing and delegation of resources, and to be certain about who has access to any resource, being 
e.g. private or cost-consuming content. To assure no one else can gain control of your personal 
cloud, secure authentication must be provided. 
Alternative service implementations – The user should not have to care about how a service is 
realized, e.g. on what technology or platform a service is implemented. This allows the user to 
choose any capable device for utilizing its personal services or for the personal cloud to relocate 
services from one capable device to another, exploiting most of the power and potential out of the 
devices. 
Service continuity, mobility and roaming – The personal cloud should allow for long lived services, 
and the current state of a service should be sustained even if a device is e.g. switching between 
different networks, such as Wi-Fi and cellular networks. Having services in the personal cloud 
maintain state throughout a user session makes it possible to continue where you went off, even if a 
device looses power, when moving between networks, etc. 
7.1.1 A new cloud deployment model 
The personal cloud deployment 
model is introduced as the fifth 
deployment model of cloud 
computing.  Figure 32 shows the 
personal cloud deployment model 
related to the existing deployment 
models described in section 5.4. In 
the figure individual users have their 
own personal clouds, which again 
may be accessing personal resources 
in public clouds, as accessing 
personal resources in the public 
cloud is one of the characteristics of 
the personal cloud. 
7.2 Challenges and 
enablers  
Many of the challenges of the 
personal cloud will be similar to that 
of the other deployment models. 
One example is allocating the services providing access to appropriate resources (service discovery) 
without user intervention. Some challenges may be implicitly solved by the properties of the 
underlying technology, e.g. privacy of historical data. Adding and removing visiting user’s services 
and devices in a personal cloud will require additional middleware related to security; in particular 
for appropriate authentication, identity and trust management.  
 
Figure 32 Cloud deployment model including personal cloud 
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7.2.1 Challenges in the personal cloud 
Authentication – Different devices may be part of the personal cloud, and they may differ in their 
capabilities. For example, some devices may not contain functionality and data to provide for strong 
user authentication.  
Establishment of trust – Devices may be dispersed and prior to any action, trust must be established 
between them. Usually, a pairing process is performed when a user needs personal devices to 
communicate with each other (e.g. by using Bluetooth); a process that verifies that the user in fact 
has control of all concerned devices. Consequently, a trust model and an identity management 
scheme for the user and all devices are required. Efficient authentication schemes for heterogeneous 
devices must also be developed; this is somewhat a challenge, because different device types have 
different inherent identifiers, if any at all.  
Data safety – Your personal data is something you want keep for yourself, so there are obviously 
privacy concerns when making all your personal data accessible from everywhere. When sharing with 
others, e.g. a visiting device, only specific resources should be accessible, and it should be possible to 
revoke a granted access to this device. There should be proper access control and data transferred 
should be encrypted. As hard drives may break down, there is also a risk of losing data. There should 
be redundancy related to storage. 
Service discovery – Each personal cloud will require its own directory of services and management 
functions towards this. In addition, it is necessary to consider where remote services will be made 
available, and through what type of directories this should be listed; they should obviously not be 
listed in a public directory. It may be necessary to have local and remote service directories for each 
personal cloud.  
Profile management – The user must have full control of available services and their interaction 
patterns. Therefore there must exist proper management services to achieve this. 
Connecting devices across network boundaries – One of the challenges of establishing connections 
between devices on different private or public networks is to “circumvent” Network Address 
Translation (NAT) routers and firewalls in safe and secure manners. 
Support for legacy devices and services – Encapsulation of legacy devices and services, in a way that 
the new security mechanisms of the personal cloud is enforced, also for devices and services that is 
not natively supported. 
Service metadata exchange – Services must be able to communicate with the other services about 
what type of services they provide. 
Uninterrupted real-time services – Services dependent on real-time media streams, such as audio or 
video telephony, may be interrupted when moving from one network to another, or if moved from 
one device to another. There should be a way for services to handover between different networks 
and between different devices. 
7.2.2 Enablers for personal cloud 
In 5.5, the general enablers for cloud computing were discussed. In this section we consider the 
additional enablers that are required to support the personal cloud, and some alternative 
implementations of them that already exist today. We will also pinpoint areas that lack supporting 
technologies today. Figure 33 illustrates some of the enablers for the personal cloud. As shown, the 
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personal cloud will depend on specific enablers, as well as general enablers already existing in the 
public clouds. 
Authentication – The devices must be able to authenticate each other in a secure way, so no one can 
add an unfamiliar device eavesdropping and drain data from the personal cloud. Some personal 
devices, e.g. mobile phones, have capabilities which could make them suitable as an authentication 
token. Mobile phones also benefit from being personal, are always there, have many channels and 
embedded cryptographic functionality. This is further elaborated in section 7.4.5.  
Identity management – Different devices may take an IdP role in different clouds, e.g. according to 
available authentication mechanisms. For the personal cloud a personal identity provider is providing 
both trust establishment, e.g. using OAuth, and secure authentication. This is further elaborated in 
section 7.4.2 and 7.4.3. Combining the mobile phone for authentication and a personal IdP into a 
mobile phone IdP is elaborated in section 7.5. 
Interconnecting networks – The personal domain spans different networks and consist of resources 
located in different networks. Those networks could be LANs behind NAT-routers/firewalls. The 
networks should be able to interconnect, so there is a need for a LAN gateway service doing NAT-
traversal. See also section 6.1. As communication between the networks take place on unsecure 
internet connections, there should be added a layer of confidentiality, by encrypting the traffic, this 
cloud be accomplished by using VPN tunnels.  
Encrypted data – Encrypting data using asymmetric keys issued by the personal IdP will make it much 
harder to get hand on personal data. 
Adding strong authentication and encrypting personal data, both stored data and data in transit, 
address the challenge about data safety. This makes it both harder to gain illegal access to personal 
data and if a personal device is lost or communication is eavesdropped, the data is unreadable 
without the proper keys. For securely storage there should be automatic backup / replication among 
several storage devices, and maybe there also should be support for an external storage service in 
the public cloud. 
Device management – The public cloud needs proper management of devices. Functionality for 
discovering, registering and unregistering devices must be solved. One way to register a device 
should be to go to a specific URL on the Internet provided by the remote management facility. The 
public cloud should support temporary registration, for instance a PC on an internet café could be 
added for doing a SIP telephony conversation, but should be un-registered shortly after that 
conversation. 
Remote management facility – Due to firewalls, services on a LAN could be blocked for outside 
connections, so there is a need for a facilitator, enabling management of devices and services behind 
a firewall from the outside, and this service should always be available on the Internet. This service 
could be considered a proxy server in the middle, and the parallel in peer-to-peer networks would be 
a supernode. OperaUnite is an example of a similar remote service facilitator, where local resources 
are made available on the Internet accessible from everywhere, through a URL, e.g.  
http://home.toralux.operaunite.com/. This service should also be situated in the public cloud. 
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Local directories – On every 
LAN there is need for a 
discovery and local 
directory of resources, such 
as devices and services, 
running on those devices. If 
a supported device is 
connected to the LAN, it 
should register to the local 
directory. If there is no 
local directory, i.e. this is 
the first device on this 
specific LAN, it should, if 
the device is capable of doing it, establish a local directory itself. See also section 6.2. 
Global directory – There should also be a global directory which is available from everywhere and 
thus should be placed in the public cloud. This global directory should have an overview of the 
complete personal cloud, including all networks and devices taking part of it. Most devices have one 
or several identities, e.g. Bluetooth address, MAC address of the networking interface, etc. and there 
must for every device be established a device name alias specific for the personal cloud. The global 
directory could alternatively be served by infrastructure in the personal domain, and only made 
accessible from the Internet using the remote management facility. 
Standardized interfaces or platforms – A common ontology of service types is required. There must 
be established standardized service interfaces and data formats to allow services to interoperate. 
Some of these standardized service interfaces will be interfaces supporting administration and 
management of the personal cloud, while other service interfaces will support specific services, e.g. 
streaming of video. Virtualization may be used to abstract away from differences in the devices’ 
underlying hardware architecture, to ease re-location of services from one device to another. For 
virtualization, see section 5.5.1.1. 
Service-wrapping to add legacy support – To support legacy devices and services which are not 
adapted to work in the personal cloud, there should be a way to wrap those legacy services into 
personal cloud native interfaces compatible for consumption in the personal cloud. This could either 
be services on devices under directly control or it could also be personal services in the public cloud. 
Service-wrapping allows controlling legacy service security within the personal cloud, to only grant 
access to parts of a service, concealing credentials and gives the possibility to both grant and revoke 
access without doing changes to the legacy service being wrapped.  
7.3 Case studies 
In this section a number of case studies will be presented which elaborate the different 
characteristics of the personal cloud and present examples of the diverse challenges and proposed 
solutions. 
7.3.1 Case study: Sharing service subscription  
This example studies the case when one user is sharing a Pay TV subscription with another user. A 
user (visitor) grants access to use his/her personalized Pay TV subscription (bound to the identity of 
 
Figure 33 Enablers for Personal Cloud 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 68 
his/her mobile phone) with another user’s TV set (host). As there is a cost connected to utilization of 
a Pay TV service, and also possibly sharing restrictions imposed from the service provider, the visitor 
only wants to grant temporary access to his/her Pay TV subscription, and possibly for a limited time 
only. The credentials of the visiting user can be considered as a resource exposed through an 
appropriate service in the personal cloud, and utilized by the TV set/set-top-box (STB), as shown in 
Figure 34: 
• The visitor chooses to share the resource to the host for 4 hours and generates an OTP 
which allows access to his/her Pay TV subscription. 
• Using a remote control the host discovers and chooses the visitor’s mobile phone by using 
the STB’s Bluetooth enumeration service.  
• The STB authenticates with the IdP by having the host using the remote control to enter the 
OTP (which is communicated on an alternative channel, exchanged by word of mouth, as 
they are sitting next to each other), and a temporary trust is established (1). Because the 
visitor’s mobile phone is in proximity of the STB, the visitor’s mobile phone is discovered, 
and hence the visitor’s identity is found and don’t have to be explicitly specified during 
registration. 
• The host’s STB then requests the visitor’s credentials for his/her Pay TV subscription. The 
visitor’s mobile phone returns an authentication assertion (see section 3.2.5.1) which gives 
access to the visitor’s Pay TV subscription (2). 
• Finally, the assertion is forwarded from the host’s STB to the Pay TV service provider (which 
is offering this Pay TV service as a personalized service from the public cloud). The Pay TV 
service provider verifies the assertion and grants access to the service for 4 hours (3). 
• (The left-most STB, normally used in the visitor’s own personal cloud, has dashed line, 
because it’s not involved in this specific setup). 
 
Figure 34 Case study: Sharing service subscription 
7.3.2 Case study: Accessing remote resources locally 
A user (host) and his visiting friend (visitor) want to watch a movie together, and the visitor has a 
number of movies on a media server none of them has seen. They decide to watch one of the 
movies, and because both of them have personal clouds, the visitor offers to share content from 
his/her media server for consumption by a media center / TV set in the host’s personal cloud. 
Because there is not any cost related to sharing content from the visitor’s media server with the 
friend’s media center, the visitor decides to give permanently access to his/her video collection, thus 
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permanent trust has to be established and a security association for subsequent authentication has 
to be established. 
The visitor uses his/her mobile phone, locates the media server in his/her global directory, selects to 
share the video collection, and generates an OTP which allows access to it. The media center has no 
Bluetooth support, so the visitor’s mobile phone can’t be detected, and the host has to manually 
enter an identifier to identify the visitor’s personal cloud. The host chooses to use a web browser 
interface on a laptop to gain access to the visitor’s media server, by entering the public URL providing 
access to the visitor’s remote management facility and enters this OTP, which is verified and a trust is 
established between the two personal clouds. Because permanent trust is established, certificates of 
their IdP’s are exchanged, allowing both 
parties to verify each other’s authentication 
assertions.  
Finally the host’s media center 
authenticates with the visitor’s mobile 
phone IdP (using an Internet connection) (1), 
as shown in Figure 35. The IdP returns an 
authentication assertion (2) which is verified 
at the visitor’s media server (3) and access is 
granted for the host’s media center to 
stream movies from the visitor’s media 
server. They can now both sit back and watch a movie together. 
7.3.3 Case study: Accessing home resources from remote  
For this case study the situation is that you have resources at home that you want to permanently 
access from another location, e.g. your work. To realize this you will establish an association between 
two LAN networks in your personal cloud. Each of the LAN networks has a Personal cloud gateway 
(PCG)-device which facilitates NAT-traversal and allows interconnected networks. The PCG is exposed 
as a service in the personal cloud and is part of the personal clouds security administration. To setup 
the association between the two networks and connect them, there is an authentication process as 
described in Figure 36. 
First the PCG at work 
requests access to 
interconnect with the PCG 
at home and 
authenticates with the 
mobile phone identity 
provider (1). The mobile 
phone IdP returns an 
authentication assertion 
to the PCG at work 
location (2). Finally, the 
PCG at work sends the 
assertion to the PCG at the other end (PCG at home) (3). 
 
Figure 35 Case study: Accessing remote resources locally 
 
Figure 36 Case study: Accessing home resources from remote 
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7.3.4 Case study: Accessing local legacy services using service wrapping 
For this case study two legacy devices need to be 
wrapped to provide personal cloud native interfaces its 
services. In this example those devices are a fileserver 
and a printer. Wrapping those device’s services will 
make the services compatible for consumption in the 
personal cloud, as shown in Figure 37.  
The file server provides storage services, and is running 
on an operating system where the service wrapper also 
could be installed. While the file server could have been 
implemented with personal cloud native storage service 
interfaces, file servers will often be considered legacy 
services as they already exist prior to establishing a 
personal cloud and is used for other purposes, not related to the personal cloud. They typically have 
legacy file systems e.g. NTFS, EXT2, EXT3 made available with legacy protocols e.g. SMB, NFS.  
The printer provides printing services running on an embedded operating system where there is 
impossible to install a service wrapper, so the service wrapper has to be installed on another device. 
We choose to install both service wrappers on the file server, as the operating service provided by 
the device hosting the file server is capable of installing service wrappers. The service wrappers 
register with the personal cloud’s global service directory and finally the services are available for 
consumption in the personal cloud. 
Accessing the wrapped services is not discussed further, as it is similar to trust-establishment and 
authentication process in the above case studies. These procedures will be detailed later in section 
7.4. 
7.3.5 Case study: Accessing services in the public cloud using service wrapping 
In this case study a personalized service in the public cloud 
needs to be wrapped for inclusion in the personal cloud.  
Personal services in the public cloud without native service 
interfaces supported by the personal cloud could be 
embedded with service wrappers, so their services would be 
exposed with supported interfaces in the personal cloud.  
An example could be the streaming music service Spotify, as 
shown in Figure 38.  As Spotify doesn’t support a personal 
cloud specific service interface, it should be considered a 
legacy device of the public cloud in this context. The only 
way to authenticate with the Spotify service is using 
username/password, and those credentials should be stored 
as metadata within the service wrapper.  
As with service wrappers for local legacy devices, they should 
make its appearance by registering in a global service directory in the personal cloud. 
 
Figure 37 Case study: Wrapping local services 
 
Figure 38 Case study: Service-wrapping in 
the public cloud 
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For other kind of services, e.g. Google Gmail which support OAuth, instead of storing and passing on 
credentials to the service provider, OAuth token credentials could be stored, so the service wrapper 
don’t have to be in possession of the actual credentials of the user’s service (see section 3.1.2). 
7.4 Personal cloud security 
This section discusses personal cloud security challenges and further discusses the challenges with 
identity management in the personal cloud.  It is foreseen that identity management should be a 
centralized feature of the personal cloud due to its dynamic characteristics. Furthermore, as an 
example, the mobile phone is proposed as a device playing the role as identity provider and expands 
on topics presented in chapter 2 and 3. 
7.4.1 Access control in the personal cloud 
Today, it is not uncommon that if a 
device/user is provided access to a private 
LAN, many services are automatically 
available as well (e.g. the printing service) 
without further access control. It may hence 
be necessary to limit access to legacy 
services; when connected to a LAN / WLAN, 
every legacy device is accessible through 
their inherent protocols and interfaces. 
Adding personal cloud services on top of 
those devices will not block access through these legacy protocols and interfaces. It could be possible 
to implement extra access control for personal services in for instance a WLAN access point (WLAN 
AP). The default operation for a WLAN AP with this extra access control implemented could be to 
only allow access to the public Internet and block all access to all local IP addresses on the LAN. To 
get access to local resources (on the LAN) the access control could require login to the personal cloud 
using your personal cloud identity, and then when a specific service is requested and if access to this 
service is granted, the WLAN AP could allow communication to the specific IP addresses and ports 
required to access this legacy service and it’s communication protocols.  
This situation is shown in Figure 39, where a laptop requests a service on the legacy device D1. It 
authenticates with the mobile phone IdP (1), the IdP returns an authentication assertion to the 
personal cloud WLAN AP (2) which is verified and the laptop is finally granted access to the service on 
D1 by allowing communication to the device D1’s IP-address on the port required by the legacy 
service on top of D1 (3). 
For now, however, the access control is considered to be a function that must be supported by 
middleware on each device part of the personal cloud, and for legacy devices, it is controlled by a 
wrapper as described in a previous section. 
7.4.2 Identity management in the personal cloud 
Every personal computing device could possibly be controlled by your personal cloud and your 
personal cloud could contain all your personal data. As you also will let visitors gain access to your 
personal cloud, it is extremely crucial that security functions for authentication and establishment of 
trust is solved in a secure and efficient way. Authentication will be a single point of attack, as an 
attacker will possibly gain access to all of your personal data, so secure authentication is very 
 
Figure 39 Limit legacy access by personal cloud WLAN AP 
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important. In the personal cloud, authentication of the users should be based on strong 
authentication such as two-factor authentication (see section 2.2.1). Cumbersome trust and resource 
sharing management, where a lot of work is required to let visitors have access to resources in your 
personal cloud, will possibly, reduce the impact of the personal cloud, and should be avoided. 
Account pr. service – Without proper identity management, the owner of a personal cloud must 
grant user access for every individual service. Using username / passwords for authentication is hard 
to govern and if a visitor wants access to a number of services, it will soon be an unmanageable task 
dealing with access management. As the owner is not an IT professional it is a risk that passwords 
don’t follow good conventions and passwords and accounts will be unchanged and enabled for 
infinity. 
Shared account – Instead of managing user access with individual accounts for every service, an 
alternative approach could be to either have a shared account for all users, or possibly also have a 
shared account for every service. Such an approach will make it impossible to revoke access for one 
user without denying access for every user or having every other user to learn a new password. 
A solution would be to introduce IdM which will allow granting access to an identity for several 
services.  
Global or local identity provider – Could a global / trusted third party identity provider be used as an 
identity provider or should the personal cloud have a personal identity provider? A global identity 
provider would have issues verifying a person’s identity and thus establishing trust, while the owner 
of the personal cloud can easily establish person to person trust as a visitor should be someone you 
already know. 
Access matrix – Do the devices and services have to know the identity of the user seeking access? If 
so, should identity control be implemented on each device / by each service or should this only be 
accomplished by the identity provider? Most devices and services do not have to know if you or a 
visiting user is accessing resources on behalf of yourself. There should be sufficient that the identity 
provider provides an access matrix where the services check whether access is granted to the 
requested resource or not. This way, there is not necessary with individual accounts at the service 
level.  
Access granularity – For an access matrix to be fine-grained enough to offer sufficient access control, 
it is necessary to limit the service offerings to only a standardized set of different services and those 
services should not require detailed access control. An example could be that it would not be 
possible to choose specific directories where a user has access on a file server.  
Owner or visitor – To add a small level of differentiated user access, there should be possible to 
distinguish access between an administrator (the owner of the personal cloud) and a guest user (a 
visitor). 
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7.4.3 Basic procedures for IdM in the personal cloud 
Identity management in the personal 
cloud requires realization of certain 
functionality. A least the following five 
identified functions needs to be 
realized. The accompanying illustration 
in Figure 40 highlights those five 
functions. 
Without an IdP in the personal cloud, it 
would be necessary to repeat these steps between all devices in the personal cloud, which of course 
would be too inconvenient, especially when taking into account the dynamic nature of the personal 
cloud (devices come and go). 
7.4.3.1 Establishment of trust between IdP and devices 
Since the IdP should assert the identity of arbitrary entities in the cloud towards other entities in the 
cloud (after successful authentication of the prior), it is necessary that the IdP have trust in all 
devices that are part of the personal cloud (1) in Figure 40. Trust may be established by multi-channel 
authentication (see also 4.3.3). All devices that should be part of the personal cloud require this 
functionality. 
To further extend the complexity of trust establishment, the process where the owner of a personal 
cloud establish trust with a visitor (as shown in Figure 41) is described below: 
1. First the owner of the 
personal cloud approves the 
visitor. This could be done by 
adding a new identity to the 
identity provider (e.g. by 
entering a URL which can 
derive the visitor’s identity). 
2. The IdP issue credentials to 
the visitor. These credentials 
could e.g. be an OTP 
displayed on the owner’s 
mobile phone or computer, 
allowing an extra channel 
when establishing trust. 
3. The visitor then authenticates with the IdP using the presented OTP.  
4. The IdP issues an assertion containing an access matrix, which the visitor sends to the service 
(S) when requesting the service. 
This example is a bit simplified as the owner and visitor will be represented by devices in their 
possession. 
 
Figure 40 IdP functionality that needs to be realized 
 
Figure 41 Establishing trust with a visitor 
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7.4.3.2 Establishment of trust between services and middleware on the devices  
If trust is established between devices (1), there is also implicit trust to the device’s services (2 in 
Figure 40), making a transitive trust from the device D1 all the way to the service SA running on top of 
DA. This trust is further discussed in the service-to-service access control section (7.4.4). 
7.4.3.3 Establishment of IdP certificate at device 
When some entity requests access to a service, it must first authenticate with the IdP, and after 
successfully authentication, the IdP will return a signed assertion back to the entity. The entity then 
forwards the assertion to the service it wants to access. The IdP’s certificate (containing its public 
key) (3 in Figure 40) is used to verify the digital signature of the assertion. This functionality is 
required for services, because they must be able to verify digital signatures.  
To be able to verify the digital signature (and hence origin) of this assertion sent by this entity to the 
service, the service needs access to the IdP’s certificate. Here is an example of how the IdP certificate 
at device establishment process could be carried out; The service has to run on top of some device. 
When the device where the service is running authenticates with the IdP, the IdP returns an 
assertion. This assertion should contain the IdP certificate and that certificate should be stored at the 
device. Functionality in the middleware on the device where the requested service is running could 
then use this certificate to verify assertions when an entity requests access to that specific service. 
7.4.3.4 Establishment of long-lasting security associations between IdP and devices  
Devices and services collaborate and form composite services, e.g. a video recording service could 
consume a video stream from a Pay TV subscription service. If a recording is scheduled during night, 
it is obvious that owner of the personal cloud can’t manually authenticate the video recording and 
Pay TV services as night, so there is a need for long-lasting security associations (SA) between the IdP 
and devices.  
If a long-lasting SA is established, later authentication between devices and the IdP will then be 
based on this SA (4 in Figure 40). This functionality is required for service consumers, because they 
must be able to authenticate towards the IdP prior to service access.   
Long-lasting security associations (SA) could be established using OAuth (see section 3.1.2). Because 
OAuth can issue long-lasting token credentials, the token credential can be used to establish long-
lasting security associations among devices and services. The token credentials will be stored and 
used for authentication, without any need for a user to re-authenticate once the security association 
is established. 
7.4.3.5 Establishment of access matrix for each device and service 
For every device and service registered with the IdP there should exist an access matrix (AM) 
containing who is granted access to the service (5 in Figure 40). This access matrix will be included in 
the authentication assertion when access to a resource is requested. As shown in section 3.2.5.1, an 
assertion might be represented as a XML document and contain arbitrary sections of metadata. One 
such metadata section could contain an access matrix. 
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7.4.4 Service-to-service access control 
So far authentication against the IdP has been 
discussed. However, because services in the personal 
cloud often will be composed out of several services, or 
visiting users will gain access to your personal cloud, a 
service requesting access to another service must be 
discussed. In this case the there is a service consumer SA 
(running on top of device D1) that requests access to a 
service provider SB (running on top of device D2) as 
shown in Figure 42. 
The authentication process is described below: 
• Prior to the service-to-service authentication, 
there is established trust between the two 
involved devices and the device D1 where the 
IdP service is running, and during this process 
the device DB obtains the IdP certificate. 
• The service consumer SA authenticates with the IdP (1) using the token credentials stored 
when the security association was established.  
• As there is a transitive trust between the service layer and the device, the messages simply 
pass through the middleware layer (1a and 1b). 
• If successfully authenticated at the IdP, the IdP returns an assertion to the middleware layer 
of device DA (2). (The complexity of the layers in D1 is neglected, as it has no importance to 
the authentication process.) 
• The device DA middleware routes (3) the assertion to the device DB middleware (where the 
service SB being requested for access is running). 
• In the middleware layer of DB, the assertion is verified against the IdP certificate previously 
stored on that device (4). 
• Next, the access matrix contained in the assertion is checked to see whether the device 
requesting access is granted access to the service SB (4). Notice that even if the consuming 
service is SA, access is granted to 
devices, so the access control checks if 
the device DA is granted access to the 
service. This is because the initial trust 
relationship is established between 
devices and not services. 
• If the verification succeeds, access to 
the service SB is granted (5), and the 
communication between the two 
services can be established. 
The authentication process above does 
compare to that one in Shibboleth (section 
3.2.5), where SB represents a  Shibboleth 
service provider and SIdB represents a 
 
Figure 42 Service to service access control, native 
service 
 
Figure 43 Service to service access control, wrapped service 
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Shibboleth identity provider.  
A quite similar example is shown in Figure 43, with the exception that instead of a native service SB 
running on a native device DB, a legacy service LD is wrapped with a special kind of wrapping device 
(WD) which exposes a service wrapper (SW) service. Every other aspect of the situations is entirely 
equal when it comes to personal cloud security and the authentication process. 
If the legacy device is a printer, the service wrapper has to properly handle printing services and must 
in addition have a printer driver, allowing it to communicate with the legacy printing device. 
7.4.5 Using mobile authentication in the personal cloud 
Any device in the personal cloud can in theory assume the role of identity provider. However, some 
devices may be more suitable than others. In this section, arguments for that the mobile phone could 
be suitable as a secure token in the personal domain are presented.  
The mobile phone could be a good candidate for being your personal authentication token, as 
already suggested in [37][38]. The most obvious reasons for using the mobile phone as an 
authentication token are: 
Very personal – The mobile phone is very personal as every person has its own mobile phone and 
subscription. 
Always available – The mobile phone is always carried with you wherever you are. 
Multi-channel – The mobile phone has many channels to interact with the user and other devices, 
e.g. screen and keyboard, speaker and microphone, as well as many communication channels, e.g. 
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, GPRS/UMTS, NFC, etc. 
Embedded cryptographic functionality – The SIM card / Smartcard in a mobile phone could be used 
to provide cryptographic functionality. 
Several runtime environments – Mobile phones typically hosts several runtime environments suitable 
for running different applications. Applications may even be hosted on the SIM card, or another 
secure element connected to the phone. 
Storage – Mobile phones usually have storage which could contain a secret element. 
The mobile phone has established standards and technologies for authenticating the user which can 
be used for mobile authentication. Both EAP-SIM and Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) are 
mechanisms for authentication using the mobile phone and it’s SIM-card (see section 3.1.3.2 and 
3.2.10 for more details). 
7.5 Mobile phone as Identity Provider 
Authentication when accessing services and establishing trust prior to sharing / delegating access to 
services lead to the need for identity management. In this section, the possibility to use the mobile 
phone as an identity provider will be discussed. Could it be relevant to expose this as a service in the 
personal cloud? 
As presented in sections 7.4.5, there are a lot of arguments for using the mobile phone as an 
authentication token and introducing identity management for personal services. Personal identity 
management shifts the focus towards users and provides stronger user control. It is user-centric and 
allows users to manage their own identities, without depending on a third party identity provider 
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[66]. Combining the needs for identity management, identity management related to mobile 
services, personalized identity management and finally the mobile phone as an authentication token, 
the mobile phone is the perfect fit being the identity provider of the personal cloud. 
7.5.1 Establishing a new mobile phone IdP 
There must be generated a certificate for the mobile phone IdP and a corresponding private/public-
key pair. This certificate can be self-signed, and this would be sufficient if you could guarantee that 
you would always be in control of you mobile phone. As the mobile phone is a small device that it is 
easy to lose, and if it is lost using the mobile phone as an identity provider need fallback options, 
alternative ways of authentication and a way to re-establish a new mobile phone as an identity 
provider.   
A new mobile phone IdP could be established by having an encrypted copy of the original IdP 
certificate and decrypt it using a master password. Such a master password in wrong hands could 
allow anyone to establish an IdP on behalf of yourself. To add stronger security the owner of the 
personal cloud should prove to have physical access to a location secured by a physical key, e.g. the 
door key of the owner’s home, and used from a device at that location, for the master password to 
provide access. However, this solution is anyhow not sufficient secure, as in theory, someone else 
(who found or stole your mobile phone) now could have a copy of the original IdP certificate 
including private key and act as IdP on behalf of yourself.  
Because there are established trust relationship bound to the certificate of the old IdP, introducing a 
new IdP with a new certificate (with a new corresponding public/private-key pair), would introduce 
trust problems in your personal cloud that has to be solved in one of three ways: 
Establish a new independent IdP – The new independent IdP will have a new certificate which can’t 
be verified, and you would have to re-establish trust with all devices with this new certificate, e.g. 
register all devices one more time, which will be a cumbersome process. 
Establish IdP from a local Certificate Authority (CA) – The new IdP will have a new certificate but, 
since it is signed by a trusted CA it can be verified against this local CA which is exposed as a service 
in the personal cloud, so trust doesn’t have to be re-established. (The certificate of the CA has been 
stored on the devices during the registration process). 
Establish IdP from a public CA – The certificate of the new IdP can be verified against a public CA, e.g. 
Verisign, otherwise this solution is similar to the case of establishing a new IdP from a local CA. In this 
case also trust doesn’t have to be re-established. Having a third-party generating and signing the IdP 
certificate will be less flexible, more bureaucratic and makes the personal cloud less independent 
from external services.  
The use of a certificate authority to establish the IdP certificate is not concluded in this section, 
however some of the problems concerning a CA is brought to attention. 
This chapter has proposed some possibly solutions to some of challenges that the personal cloud has 
to overcome, however the challenges and solutions has to be further elaborated to find the best way 
to secure the personal cloud. Eventually the final proposed solutions must be specified in details and 
finally implemented in a real-life personal cloud solution. 
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8 Cloud security analysis 
In this chapter a general security analysis will be performed using the CORAS [3] process. The CORAS 
process is a system development process based on the integration of UP and a standardised security 
risk management process, using the CORAS language, a risk modelling language with graphical 
representation.  
8.1 Security analysis of existing cloud deployment models 
First security analysis is performed for the existing cloud deployment models, private, public and 
hybrid clouds. 
8.1.1 Identifying assets 
Figure 44 shows a CORAS asset 
diagram where the stakeholder 
for this analysis will be the cloud 
customer, the target will be the 
cloud customer’s information 
system, and data is regarded to 
be the only asset, as it is the only 
common asset applying to every 
cloud customer. Other 
stakeholders could be the cloud 
provider or the end-user, but the concerns of the cloud customer who provides the services and 
whose business depends on its data is where the focus for this analysis is. 
A consequence scale (Table 7) is defined for the Data-asset and a likelihood scale (Table 8) is defined 
for the CORAS security analysis.  
Consequence value Description 
Catastrophic All data end up in competitors custody, into public or all data lost 
Major Some data end up in competitors custody, into public or large amounts of 
important data lost / important data corrupted 
Moderate Data fragments leaked to competition, into public or some amounts of 
important data lost / non-important data corrupted 
Minor Non-important data lost 
Insignificant No data lost 
Table 7 CORAS consequence scale table (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
Likelihood value Description 
Certain Five times or more per year 
Likely Two to five times per year 
Possible Once a year 
Unlikely Less than once per year 
Rare Less than once per ten years 
Table 8 CORAS likelihood scale table (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
A risk evaluation matrix is then defined (Table 9). For every combination of consequence and 
frequency there are determined if the consequence / frequency pairs should be considered 
acceptable or not. 
 
Figure 44 CORAS asset diagram (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
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  Consequence 
  Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
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Rare Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable 
Unlikely Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Possible Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Likely Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Certain Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Table 9 CORAS risk evaluation matrix (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
8.1.2 High level security analysis 
During high level security analysis a CORAS threat diagram is created (Figure 45), where the single 
identified asset (rightmost) and three typical threats (leftmost) are considered. Vulnerabilities, threat 
scenarios and unwanted incidents are identified, according to each of the deployment models. The 
vulnerabilities, threat scenarios and unwanted incidents in clouds computing will be described the 
from a confidentiality and authentication point of view. 
 
Figure 45 CORAS threat diagram (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
8.1.2.1 High level security analysis in private clouds 
The threats considered are a hacker (human threat, deliberate), and an administrative user e.g. 
representing the customer (human threat, accidental). A hacker might use a weak authentication 
vulnerability to perform dictionary or brute force attacks. If authentication and administrative user 
interfaces are exposed to the web the hacker could perform a phishing attack, leading to lost 
password for the administrative user. The administrative user might also accidentally help the hacker 
by choosing a weak password or use passwords already used on other services. 
8.1.2.2 High level security analysis in public clouds 
Public clouds include every security issue from private clouds and add issues tied to data separation 
given a cloud provider storing data and hosting services for several organizations at the same 
location. We introduce a new threat, the cloud system itself (non-human threat). A vulnerability in 
the system of poorly separated data, and a scenario where the data are stored unencrypted could 
lead to the unwanted incident of data leaked to other customers within the same cloud provider.  
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8.1.3 High level security analysis in hybrid clouds 
Since the border/scope of hybrid clouds is less defined than for both private and public clouds, these 
clouds may incorporate critical security vulnerabilities. They also add security vulnerabilities due to 
the interfacing between clouds; when there exists an interface for using functionality, there is also an 
interface for potential abuse of said functionality. 
8.1.4 Risk analysis 
Probable likelihood and consequences are applied to the threat diagram, which in turn translates 
into risks. There are identified four risks (Figure 46) which are listed in the risks consequence matrix 
(Table 10). All four risks are found to be unacceptable, and thus the vulnerabilities opening for the 
risks need treatment 
 
Figure 46 CORAS risk analysis diagram (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
 
 
  Consequence 
  Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
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Rare      
Unlikely     R4 
Possible    R3  
Likely    R2  
Certain    R1  
Table 10 CORAS risk evaluation matrix with risks consequence (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
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8.2 Treatment 
Four risks are considered unacceptable and the vulnerabilities opening for the risks need treatment. 
As suggested in the treatment diagram (Figure 47) one treatment address three vulnerabilities while 
a second treatment address a forth vulnerability. Introducing strong authentication as suggested in 
the sections 3.1.1 and 7.4.5 would treat the weak authentication, weak password and reused 
password vulnerabilities, and thus render the subsequent vulnerability “Web exposed 
administration” impossible. Introducing encrypting of all data using customer specific keys would 
treat the weak data separation vulnerability, because even if data are leaked within the cloud, those 
data would be unreadable by other customers. 
 
Figure 47 CORAS treatment diagram (existing cloud computing deployment models) 
8.3 Security analysis of the personal cloud 
After performing a security analysis for the existing cloud deployment models, a security analysis for 
the newly introduced personal cloud deployment model will be performed. 
8.3.1 Identifying assets 
The personal cloud is somewhat different from the existing deployment models and thus other 
stakeholders and other assets must be identified. The stakeholders for personal cloud are considered 
to be the owner and a visitor. The owner is the user that owns / operates the personal cloud, while 
the visitor is a guest-user who shares or consumes resources related to the owner’s personal cloud.  
Figure 48 shows a proposed CORAS asset diagram for the personal cloud. 
The identified assets in the personal cloud (as shown in Figure 48) are: 
System availability – Since every personal computing device will take place in the personal cloud, you 
will be very dependant of the availability of your personal cloud, to do everyday tasks involving 
computing devices. 
Sensitive personal information – Documents and files disclosing sensitive personal information, 
information regarding your privacy, e.g. credit card numbers, personal relations, information about 
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private transactions, where you have been at a given time, etc. which should not be made public or 
end up in an arbitrary person’s possession. Sensitive personal information includes identifying 
information, which can unveil your identity, e.g. SSN, full name and address, phone number. 
User generated content – Private 
files, e.g. media files containing 
pictures/video, of great personal 
value which should be protected 
from being lost or corrupted. 
Personal finance – If someone gets 
access to your bank account or 
credit-cards, or cost-consuming 
services are abused, this could 
have a severe negative influence 
on your personal finance. Cost-
consuming services are services where there are a cost or premium tied to its usage, e.g. Pay TV and 
telephony services, which usage should be monitored and the costs should be controlled. 
The stakeholders are the owner (the one in control of the personal cloud) and the visitor (the guest 
user being granted access to certain resources in the personal cloud by the owner). 
Consequence scales are defined for the assets and a likelihood scale (Table 14) is defined for the 
CORAS security analysis: 
• Table 11 CORAS consequence scale table (personal cloud, asset system availability) 
• Table 12 CORAS consequence scale table (personal cloud, asset personal finance) 
• Table 13 CORAS consequence scale table (personal cloud, assets sensitive personal 
information and user generated content) (the consequence scale table is common for both 
assets) 
•  
Consequence value Description 
Catastrophic The system is totally unavailable 
Major Important parts of the system are unavailable 
Moderate Non-important parts of the system are unavailable 
Minor Trivial parts of the system are unavailable 
Table 11 CORAS consequence scale table (personal cloud, asset system availability) 
 
Consequence value Description 
Catastrophic Someone gets control of your bank account or credit card 
Major Someone can cause harm that has a considerable cost 
Moderate Someone can cause harm that has a moderate cost 
Minor Someone can cause harm that has a low cost 
Table 12 CORAS consequence scale table (personal cloud, asset personal finance) 
 
 
Figure 48 CORAS asset diagram (personal cloud) 
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Consequence value Description 
Catastrophic All data end up in into public or all data lost 
Major Some data end up into public or large amounts of important data lost / 
important data corrupted 
Moderate Data fragments leaked into public or some amounts of important data lost / 
non-important data corrupted 
Minor Non-important data lost 
Table 13 CORAS consequence scale table (personal cloud, assets sensitive personal information and user generated 
content) 
 
Likelihood value Description 
Certain Five times or more per year 
Likely Two to five times per year 
Possible Once a year 
Unlikely Less than once per year 
Rare Less than once per ten years 
Table 14 CORAS likelihood scale table (personal cloud) 
A risk evaluation matrix is then defined (Table 15). For every combination of consequence and 
frequency there are determined if the consequence / frequency pairs should be considered 
acceptable or not. 
  Consequence 
  Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
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Rare Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable 
Unlikely Acceptable Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Possible Acceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Likely Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Certain Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable 
Table 15 CORAS risk evaluation matrix (personal cloud) 
 
8.3.2 High level security analysis 
During high level security analysis of the personal cloud, a CORAS threat diagram is created (Figure 
49), where four identified assets (rightmost) and four typical threats (leftmost) are considered. 
Vulnerabilities, threat scenarios and unwanted incidents of the personal cloud are identified.  
The threats considered are a deliberate user, the owner, a visitor and the personal cloud system 
itself. The deliberate user might steal the mobile IdP or another device taking part of the personal 
cloud. The owner might as well lose the mobile IdP or another device taking part of the personal 
cloud. The visitor, if granted access to the owner’s personal cloud, might lose a device which is 
incorporated into the owner’s personal cloud (a trusted device). 
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Figure 49 CORAS threat diagram (personal cloud) 
A deliberate user might access legacy services in a fraudulently way to circumvent personal cloud 
security governance, by e.g. hacking into your Wi-Fi network, so personal data is accessed in an 
illegitimate way. This could harm both sensitive personal information and user generated content. 
The owner might lose the mobile phone identity provider or a deliberate user might steel it. If there 
is no personal certificate authority service in the personal cloud, trust to the new IdP can’t be re-
established in a convenient way and the owner might lose access to his/her personal cloud. This 
affects system availability. If the IdP is non-revocable and it get possessed by a deliberate user, the 
deliberate user could get illegitimate personal cloud management and access control which could 
harm personal finance, sensitive personal information and user generated content. The owner or a 
visitor could lose a device (other than the mobile phone, used as an IdP), or a device cloud be stolen 
by a deliberate user. The device could then end up in possession by a deliberate user, who could get 
illegitimate access to personal data, and this could harm both sensitive personal information and 
user generated content. Finally there could be a hardware failure on a storage device, and if this 
storage device doesn’t have redundancy, this could end up with losing access to own personal cloud 
(which harms system availability) or files or data might be lost (which harms user generated content). 
8.3.3 Risk analysis 
Probable likelihood and consequences are applied to the threat diagram, which in turn translates 
into risks. There are identified 7 risks (Figure 50) which are listed in the risks consequence matrix 
(Table 16). Three of those risks are found to be unacceptable, and thus the vulnerabilities opening for 
the risks need treatment. 
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Figure 50 CORAS risk analysis diagram (personal cloud) 
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Rare     
Unlikely  R2, R4, R5, R6 R7 R3 
Possible  R1   
Likely     
Certain     
Table 16 CORAS risk evaluation matrix with risks consequence (personal cloud) 
8.4 Treatment 
Three risks are considered unacceptable and the vulnerabilities opening for the risks need treatment. 
As suggested in the treatment diagram (Figure 51), the vulnerability of having an IdP with a 
certificate which is not verifiable by a certificate authority, might be treated by introducing a 
personal CA service (as discussed in section 7.5.1). This CA service might as well blacklist a previous 
issued IdP certificate if the mobile phone IdP gets lost or is stolen, so the IdP certificate is revoked, to 
overcome the vulnerability of a non-revocable IdP. However, this requires the CA to be inquired 
regularly, so the service providers always have a list of the valid IdP certificates when verifying 
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assertions from service consumers. The vulnerability of having a deliberate user accessing legacy 
services by legacy protocols could be treated by denying access to legacy services (every service has 
to be a native service or be wrapped into a native personal cloud service). Another way could be to 
introduce a WLAN AP with extra access control implemented (as discussed in section 7.4.1). Finally, 
the vulnerability of having a hardware failure on a storage device might be solved by having 
automatic backup / replication among several storage devices. This could also be solved by using an 
external storage service in the public cloud, which is assumed to be professionally operated and to 
have better redundancy than a personal operated service (discussed in section 7.2.2, enablers for the 
personal cloud). 
 
Figure 51 CORAS treatment diagram (personal cloud) 
Now, security analysis for all the existing and, in particularly the newly introduced personal cloud 
deployment model, has been performed. 
Only a limited set of vulnerabilities and threat scenarios are identified, and there might as well be 
others. The risk evaluation matrixes are also quite rough, and both consequences and likelihoods 
have been set in a quite approximately manner. However, this throws light on some of the security 
problems that exists in cloud computing, in particularly to the personal cloud, and indicates how 
those problems might be solved by proposing treatments to the unacceptable vulnerabilities. 
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9 SIP security in the personal cloud 
A personal cloud without any services is of no value, thus the personal cloud should be populated 
with a lot of services running on different devices. An IP telephony service would bring valuable 
utility to a personal cloud, and could be such a service, as illustrated in Figure 52. 
As has been suggested in the chapter 
about personal cloud, it would be of 
value for each user to have one 
dedicated device that could provide the 
personal cloud with security services, 
like e.g. strong authentication. Also, it 
was suggested that the mobile phone 
could be one such device, since it 
already is quite ubiquitous, it already 
carries at least one secure token (the 
SIM) with embedded security 
functionality, it typically hosts several 
application execution environments 
(JavaCard, Java, C++, etc.), and since it 
may support several different 
authentication schemes due to its many available communication channels (e.g. SMS, GPRS, Wi-Fi, 
Bluetooth).  
This chapter is meant to exemplify how the mobile phone can be utilised as a provider of security 
services for a typically personalized, Internet-based service, namely telephony based on the SIP 
protocols. This example is carried out by implementing a prototype which allows a SIP service to be 
accessed using a SIM-card as an authentication token, from any capable device, such as e.g. a PC at 
home or a PC at an internet cafe. During the master project period, a working solution has been 
developed, and requirements analysis, design of the solution, as well as implementation details, will 
be presented in this chapter. Finally, SIP is pulled into the personal cloud as a personalized service, by 
proposing an architecture where a SIP service is integrated into a true part of the personal cloud.  
The main difference from existing approaches is that we don’t consider SIP as a single application 
with a set of credentials, but instead as a voice telephony service that can be realised by many 
different applications that may reside at different locations.   
9.1 Introduction 
IP based telephony (VoIP), such as services based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) (see section 
6.4.1), has gained popularity as more services are transferred to from traditional telecom networks 
to computer networks. A SIP User Agent Client (UAC) typically registers and authenticates to a SIP 
User Agent Server (UAS) using username and password.  
The authentication mechanism used when registering is typically HTTP Digest Authentication, a 
challenge-response authentication scheme inherited by the HTTP protocol. HTTP Digest 
Authentication is an algorithm for computing the challenge response using the MD5 [55] hash of a 
combination of user name, realm and password (see also section 6.4.1.3 for a more detailed 
 
Figure 52 Pulling SIP into personal cloud 
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description). As other secret based authentication schemes, it suffers from inherent vulnerabilities, 
and thus is by many considered an unsatisfactory authentication method. Mobile phone users do 
already have an identity in the mobile operators network (IMSI) that does not map into a username, 
and hence an additional username requires management of several identities. As presented in 
section 7.4, using the mobile phone for authentication is found suitable for other services and 
applications. 
The authentication process is particularly important when access to the VoIP service incurs a cost for 
the user (i.e., commercial providers of VoIP where call termination on the PSTN is supported as well). 
An end-user could benefit from using the identity from the mobile operator for VoIP services as well, 
as this could lead to only one invoice for both mobile- and VoIP phone services. 
Since authentication of IMS based services is based on the mobile identity, i.e., an identifier and 
credentials present on a U/SIM carried by the user in his/her mobile phone; it is desirable to re-use 
the same authentication mechanism also in standard SIP. Being able to consolidate the identities for 
SIP and IMS services is one step towards achieving service convergence and a better, consistent and 
ubiquitous service experience for the end-users. 
The overall goals when designing the solution were: 
• Enable common, application independent IdM for SIP & IMS 
• Introduce Strong 2-factor authentication for SIP 
• Require minimal changes to SIP UA Client 
• Require minimal changes to SIP server 
• Re-use existing SIP protocol for user registration 
9.2 Requirements analysis 
A brief requirement analysis is performed and a UML use-case diagram [2] is constructed. The 
administration and management of 
the SIP solution is not considered 
important in this context, so the 
administrator and the system roles are 
left out and the only actor found 
necessary for realizing this prototype is 
the Subscriber.  
For the Subscriber to utilize a SIP-client 
and make use of the essential 
expected functionality, the solution 
requires the following four use cases, 
as shown in Figure 53: 
• Install SIP-client 
• Run SIP-client 
• Make call  
• Accept call  
 
The user of other SIP services than e.g. making and accepting phone calls, will not be covered by the 
realizing prototype. Each of the use cases will be described in greater detail below.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53 Use case diagram 
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9.2.1 Use case: Install SIP-client 
Use case: Install SIP-client 
ID: 1 
Brief description: The Subscriber wants to install a SIP-client to be able to use the Internet to 
communicate with friends and family, e.g. to make phone calls. 
Primary actors: Subscriber 
Preconditions: None. 
Main flow: 1. The use case begins when the Subscriber inserts a USB dongle containing the 
SIP-client into a USB port. 
2. The installation automatically starts when the USB dongle is inserted. 
3. During installation the Subscriber is asked for a SIP username  
4. If the SIM-card is PIN-code protected  
4.1. The user has to enter a PIN-code. 
4.2. The PIN-code is validated during accessing the SIM-card. 
5. The SIP username is associated with the IMSI (this is also called pre-
registering). 
Postconditions: 1. The SIP-client is installed and the SIP username is associated with the IMSI. 
Alternative flows: Invalid PIN-Code 
Table 17 Use case: Install SIP-client 
Alternative flow: Install SIP-client : Invalid PIN-code 
ID: 1.1 
Brief description: An invalid PIN-code is entered and the installation informs the Subscriber. 
Primary actors: Subscriber 
Preconditions: 1. The Subscriber has entered an invalid PIN-code 
Main flow: 1. The alternative flow begins after step 4.2 of the main flow. 
2. The installation informs the Subscriber that an invalid PIN-code is entered. 
Postconditions: None. 
Table 18 Alternative flow: Install SIP-client : Invalid PIN-code 
9.2.2 Use case: Run SIP-client 
Use case: Run SIP-client 
ID: 2 
Brief description: The Subscriber wants to start the SIP-client which will then accepts phone calls 
from the surroundings. 
Primary actors: Subscriber 
Preconditions: 1. The SIP-client must be successfully installed. 
Main flow: 1. The Subscriber starts the SIP-client 
2. The SIP-client registers with the SIP-server. 
Postconditions: 1. The SIP-client is registered with the SIP-server. 
Table 19 Use case: Run SIP-client 
Having the SIP-client registering with the SIP server corresponds to the “REGISTER“ SIP-message. 
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9.2.3 Use case: Make call 
Use case: Make call 
ID: 3 
Brief description: The Subscriber wants to make a phone-call using the SIP-client. 
Primary actors: Subscriber 
Preconditions: 1. The SIP-client must be running. 
Main flow: 1. The Subscriber enters a phone number in the SIP-client. 
2. The Subscriber presses the Dial-button. 
3. If a recipient answers 
3.1. While in call 
3.1.1. The Subscriber and a recipient have a conversation 
3.2. One of the parties hangs up 
Postconditions: 1. The SIP-client is registered with the SIP-server. 
Table 20 Use case: Make call 
Making a call corresponds to the “INVITE” SIP-message. 
9.2.4 Use case: Accept call 
Use case: Accept call 
ID: 4 
Brief description: The phone rings and the Subscriber want to accept the phone call using the SIP-
client. 
Primary actors: Subscriber 
Preconditions: 1. The SIP-client must be running and the SIP-client is ringing. 
Main flow: 1. If the Subscriber accepts the call. 
1.1. While in call 
1.1.1. The Subscriber and a caller have a conversation 
1.2. One of the parties hangs up 
Postconditions: 1. The SIP-client is registered with the SIP-server. 
Table 21 Use case: Accept call 
Accepting a call corresponds to the “ACK” SIP-message. 
9.3 System architecture 
First a somewhat simplified, generic 
architecture is shown in Figure 54. The system 
consists of at least two SIP-clients and a SIP 
Registrar where the clients want to register. 
The rightmost client registers using some 
traditional authentication mechanism, while 
the leftmost client, however, wants to register 
using a “Secure element”, and a Local SIP 
Proxy is facilitating this authentication 
process. When authenticating, a secure token 
is established with the Validator service. 
When registering with the SIP Registrar the same token is used, and the SIP Registrar  is able to verify 
the authenticity of the request by verifying the token with the Validator service. The complete 
registration and authentication process will be described in greater detail later, but first the different 
components involved will be closer presented. 
 
Figure 54 Simplified, generic architecture 
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9.3.1 Component diagram 
Instead of an generic Secret 
element and a generic 
Validator as presented in the, 
the section above, the more 
specific solution which is 
implemented will depend on 
properties and functionality 
with mobile phones and 
mobile networks. Instead of a 
generic Secret element, a 
U/SIM is used, and instead of 
a generic Validator, a 
combination of a RADIUS and 
a DBMS is used. 
The components and their 
responsibilities are as follows 
(see Figure 55): 
SIP UAC – A SIP User Agent 
Client (UAC) implemented as 
software or hardware. X-Lite and PJSIP are examples of such software. Cisco provides hardware-
based SIP UACs. 
Local SIP Proxy – Is a software component that acts as both a SIP Registrar and a SIP UAC (usually 
called a back-to-back user-agent, B2BUA) for the purpose of making requests on behalf of SIP UACs. 
The Local SIP Proxy is a listening server on the host computer (PC) of the SIP UAC. Local presence is 
required because it needs access to the Supplicant. It listens on a predefined port, to which the SIP 
UAC is configured to communicate. It interprets, and when necessary, intercepts the SIP 
communication, rewriting specific parts of SIP request/response messages before forwarding them 
to the SIP Registrar. It has two interfaces; one that communicates with the Supplicant, and another 
that acts as a SIP proxy for authenticating the SIP UAC. 
Supplicant – Is a software component at one end of a network connection that seeks to be 
authenticated by an authenticator attached to the other end of a back-channel link connecting the 
two. The Supplicant has an interface used by the Local SIP Proxy to authenticate. After successful 
authentication, the Supplicant returns an authentication token that proofs the authenticated user 
session within an authentication domain. In this specific case, the returned data is a password for use 
with SIP registration. This Supplicant is also able to communicate with a user’s U/SIM, either across a 
USB connection using PC/SC [68], or across a Bluetooth connection using SAP [69]. Across both 
interfaces, messages are exchanged according to [70]. 
U/SIM – Represents a standard GSM SIM or UMTS USIM.  
RADIUS – Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) represents a server that provides 
centralized Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) services (see section 3.1.3). 
  
Figure 55 Overall architecture of proposed solution 
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SIP Registrar – Represents a SIP server in the network where the SIP UAC tries to register. 
Registration may be required to access SIP services, access to PSTN/GSM services, as well as to be 
reachable by other peers. 
HLR/HSS – GSM HLR (Home Location Register) with an AuC (Authentication Center) or UMTS HSS 
(Home Subscriber Server) or IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) that manages the authentication 
process. The HLR/HSS has access to the required authentication data in the mobile network. 
Authenticator – The authenticator has the ability to verify whether the credentials presented to it are 
valid are not. The Authenticator does this by contacting the HLR/HSS for the actual verification 
process. 
9.3.2 The registration process 
This section describes the SIP 
Register process, illustrated by three 
high-level sequence diagrams. 
Figure 56 shows a message sequence 
diagram for the overall 
authentication and registration 
process between the SIP UAC and the 
SIP Registrar. 
9.3.2.1 Establishing a common 
password  
First, the SIP UAC issues a “SIP 
REGISTER” request towards the Local 
SIP Proxy (which seems like an 
ordinary SIP Registrar server from 
the SIP UAC’s point of view). The 
Local SIP Proxy responds with a “100 
Trying”, to avoid that the UAC times 
out during the rest of the process. Thereafter, the Local SIP Proxy issues a “REGISTER” request 
towards the actual SIP Registrar. Since the UAC is not yet registered, the SIP Registrar will respond 
with a “401 Unauthorized”, including values (nonce, realm) for use in the final HTTP Digest 
authentication. After receiving 
this message, the Local SIP Proxy 
will issue an authentication 
request towards the Supplicant. 
The Supplicant will in turn initiate 
the authentication procedure 
towards the Authenticator. The 
actual authentication procedure 
between the Supplicant and the 
Authenticator is illustrated in 
Figure 57. 
The authentication process 
 
Figure 56 Main authentication process 
 
Figure 57 The actual user authentication process between Supplicant and 
Authenticator, based on U/SIM credentials 
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shown in Figure 57 is one way of embedding the U/SIM as an authentication token in SIP. First, the 
Supplicant sends a representation of the user identity using the International Mobile Subscriber 
Identity (IMSI) to the Authenticator (this has been previously acquired from the U/SIM, but is not 
shown to make the diagram easier to read). The Authenticator returns a challenge (RAND) to the 
Supplicant. This challenge is previously received from the HLR/HSS of the mobile network as part of a 
set of GSM triplets for the specific user. The Supplicant forwards the challenge to the U/SIM, which 
generates (using algorithm A3) a signed response (SRES) using the challenge and the private key Ki 
stored on the U/SIM as input (as described in section 4.3.2.1).  
9.3.2.2 Data-flow during authentication / SIP registration 
Figure 58 shows the flow of the 
authentication data; the main point 
being that the SRES (and optionally 
the Kc) is incorporated into the 
Authorization header of the final SIP 
REGISTER message. The rest of the 
data are according to the standard 
specifications [24][55]. 
9.3.2.3 Alternative ways to 
finalize the registration 
process 
There are several alternatives for the 
rest of the process: 
One alternative is to use the SRES as a 
password directly in the next SIP 
Register. This is the procedure that is 
illustrated in Figure 57. The 
Authenticator will also have the same 
SRES, and it is never exchanged across 
an insecure link. The Authenticator 
will thus be able to verify that the 
received HTTP Digest is valid. 
Another option, which is the one 
implemented in the current prototype, is to perform a complete EAP-SIM (see section 3.1.3.2) 
mutual authentication between the Supplicant and Authenticator, and after successful 
authentication, the Authenticator may send a One-Time-Password (OTP) to the Supplicant across a 
secure channel. This OTP may then be used as a password in the final SIP Register message. 
A third option is that after successful authentication between the Supplicant and the Authenticator, 
they may exchange a shared secret using an asymmetric key exchange protocol like e.g. Diffie-
Hellman, and use this secret in the final SIP Register process. 
 
Figure 58 Data-flow during authentication / SIP registration 
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Figure 59 shows the final SIP 
Register procedure, where the 
Local SIP Proxy issues a new 
“REGISTER” request towards the 
SIP Registrar. The SIP Registrar 
contacts the Authenticator to 
validate the HTTP Digest that 
came with the request. A 
RADIUS/DIAMETER server will 
typically implement the actual 
validation process of the digest, 
but for clarity, some 
components have been left out from the illustrations (
55 includes all components). If the HTTP Digest is OK (i.e., the password is correct), the SIP Registrar 
responds with “200 OK” to the Local SIP Proxy, which in turn finally responds with a “200 OK” to the 
SIP UAC. The user is now successfully authenticated and the SIP UAC regist
Figure 60 Complete sequence diagram of the whole registration process
Finally Figure 60 shows a complete sequence diagram of the whol
from all the high-level sequence diagrams
9.4 Realization of a Prototype
This section describes how the prototype was actually implemented. Finally installation and 
execution of the prototype is presented
The prototype Local SIP Proxy was implemented in Java as a SIP Servlet
supposed to run on top of the leight
Jetty HTTP Servlet engine, and has extended Jetty by adding support for SIP Servlets. Cipango is 
compliant with SIP Servlets 1.1. 
The Local SIP Proxy is dependent of a lot of other software components, as further described in the
next section. 
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The actual implementation, as shown in 
ered. 
 
e registration process
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. 
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Figure 59 The final registration process between SIP UA and SIP Registrar
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9.4.1 Implementation architecture 
The components and their 
responsibilities are 
described in section 9.3.1, 
however the actual 
architecture used when 
realizing the prototype and 
during deployment of the 
solution is shown in Figure 
61. 
First the software 
components on the client 
computer are described: 
The SIP-client (SIP UAC) 
chosen was Express Talk 
from NCH Software, as it 
allowed for re-packaging 
and customization of its 
configuration, as we 
needed to dynamically 
override certain properties, 
e.g. username, IP-address 
to SIP Server, etc. The SIP-
client communicates 
through interface Ia using 
the SIP protocol. 
The Local SIP Proxy called SimpleB2BUAProxyServlet is implemented by the author of this master 
thesis, and will later be described in greater detail. For the SIP-client, the Local SIP Proxy is perceived 
as a SIP-server and is communicating with the SIP-client on the interface Ia using the SIP protocol. The 
Local SIP Proxy also has an interface Ib which is used when invoking the Supplicant trough java 
method-calls. 
Ubisafe UnifID Supplicant is a generic Supplicant which already was implemented by Ubisafe, prior to 
realizing this prototype. The Supplicant mediates with the companion Ubisafe UnifID Authenticator 
(interface If). The Supplicant performs a complete EAP-SIM mutual authentication between the 
Supplicant and Authenticator. This Supplicant is also able to communicate with a user’s U/SIM 
(interface Id) using APDUs according to the SIM’s interface, and an optional PIN can be specified if 
required. In the prototype the Supplicant communicate with the U/SIM across a USB connection 
(interface Ic) using PC/SC [58]. The supplicant is also invoked during installation to bind the IMSI and 
when the SIP-client is registering with the SIP-server. 
USB dongle is a USB device with a flash storage (for storing the installation packages of the complete 
client software solution) and integrated SIM card reader, and the SIM card inserted into the USB 
dongle is a U/SIM which represents a standard GSM SIM or UMTS USIM. 
Next the software components running on Ubisafe servers are described: 
 
Figure 61 Deployment / realization diagram of prototype 
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The SIP-server (SIP Registrar) is OpenSIPS (Open SIP Server), and the Local SIP Proxy communicates 
with this SIP-server through interface Ie. OpenSIPS is an open source SIP server implementation, and 
through a module called “aaa_radius”, authentication against RADIUS servers is supported. In this 
actual deployment, OpenSIPS authenticates against a FreeRADIUS server over interface Ig. 
FreeRADIUS is an open source RADIUS suite which is able to use a backend MySQL database to 
provide authentication (over interface Ih), through a module called “Rlm sql mysql”. The backend 
database, MySQL, is a open source relational database management system (RDBMS). 
Ubisafe UnifID Authenticator is a generic Authenticator which already was implemented by Ubisafe, 
prior to realizing this prototype. The Authenticator mediates with the companion Ubisafe UnifID 
Supplicant (interface If). The Authenticator updates the MySQL with a one-time-password using SQL 
statements over interface Ii and has a RADIUS client which is used to authenticate with the 8950 AAA 
RADIUS server over interface Ij. 
In the back-end, the Generic SIM Authentication System has an Authentication Server that 
authenticates the Supplicants. A RADIUS server will be used as the Authentication Server because it is 
currently the de-facto standard for remote authentication. The reader is referred to section 2.6 for 
more information on RADIUS. To perform the GSM authentication the RADIUS server will use the 
EAP-SIM Plug-in and GSM Gateway Client. 
The final software components are installed at Telenor’s headquarters in Fornebu, Norway. 8950 
AAA is a RADIUS server that has a GSM map gateway client, which supports Ulticom Signalware and 
communicates through interface Ik. Ulticom Signalware is a map gateway, with support for the major 
telecom operating systems, server platforms, SS7 and SIGTRAN standards. The 8950 AAA and Ulticom 
Signalware servers are installed in a Telenor test-bed and communicating with Telenor’s production 
HLR/HSS and forms a complete authentication path. 
9.4.2 Local SIP Proxy 
The Local SIP Proxy is a novel software component of this solution, and will be further described in 
this section. 
9.4.2.1 Back-to-back user agent 
The Local SIP Proxy is implemented 
as a Back-to-Back User Agent 
(B2BUA). The SIP standard [54] 
defines a back-to-back user agent as 
a logical entity that receives a 
request and processes it as a user 
agent server (UAS). It acts as a user agent client (UAC) and generates requests on behalf of it. Unlike 
a SIP proxy server, which only forward messages unmodified, a B2BUA maintains a dialogue state 
and must participate in all requests sent on the dialogues it has established (see Figure 62). The 
capability of B2BUA makes it possible to develop more sophisticated SIP applications that cannot 
otherwise be implemented as a SIP proxy, such as the Local SIP Proxy which has to intercept the 
communication between the SIP-client and the SIP-server. 
 
Figure 62 B2BUA having two dialogs 
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9.4.2.2 Java libraries and classes
The class diagram of the Local SIP 
Proxy is shown in Figure 63. The main 
class of the Local SIP Proxy is 
SimpleB2BuaProxyServlet, which
implements the SipServlet interface
SimpleB2BuaProxyServlet makes use 
of various supporting classes.  
The functionality from the Ubisafe 
UnifID Supplicant was used to 
communicate with the USB dongle 
and the user’s U/SIM, e.g. 
ServiceCore class in the 
no.ubisafe.unifid.supplicant.se
rviceSupplicant.core package.
To support SIP Servlet specific 
functionality and the var
cryptographic functions (such as MD5 
and HTTP Digest) various libraries 
developed by SUN and Ericsson AB 
were used; the classes used w
ClientDigestCreator, HeaderParser, 
AuthHeaderProcessor and 
AuthInfoImpl and can be found in the 
The other classes and interfaces are part of 
Servlet and SIP Servlet specifications.
9.4.2.3 Interception 
Instead of just forwarding messages as a SIP proxy
intercepts the SIP request and response messages, 
UAC dialog towards the SIP-server is a slightly manipulated 
UAS dialog towards the SIP-client
using security functions of the mobile phone, fully transparent for the SIP
9.4.2.4 Message flow 
The internal message flow of the Local SIP Proxy is shown in 
components communicating with Local SIP Proxy are included
sub-diagram of the complete sequence diagram shown in 
• The SIP-client sends a “REGISTE
an ordinary SIP Registrar server from the SIP
responds with a “100 Trying”, to avoid that the SIP
process.  
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org.jvnet.glassfish.comms.security.auth.impl
the javax.servlet.sip package, to support the generic 
 
 would do, the B2BUA-based Local SIP
and maintains two different dialogs where the 
SIP message sequence
, making possible an alternative way to authenticate the SIP
-client. 
Figure 64, where only messages and 
, is described below: (
Figure 60). 
R” request (1) towards the Local SIP Proxy (which seems like 
-client’s point of view). The Local SIP Proxy 
-client timeout during the rest of the 
Figure 63 Class diagram of Local SIP Proxy 
 package. 
 Proxy 
 compared to the 
-client 
Figure 64 is a 
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• Thereafter, the Local SIP Proxy issues a “REGISTER” request (1.2) towards the actual SIP-
server.  
• Since the UAC is not yet registered, the SIP Registrar will respond (1.2.1) with a “401 
Unauthorized”, including values (nonce, realm) for use in the final HTTP Digest 
authentication.  
• After receiving this message, the Local SIP Proxy will issue an authentication request (2) 
towards the Supplicant. The Supplicant will in turn initiate the authentication procedure 
towards the Authenticator.  
• The Local SIP Proxy doesn’t care about the actual authentication procedure between the 
Supplicant and the Authenticator, (which is accomplished by performing a complete EAP-SIM 
mutual authentication between the Supplicant and Authenticator, as covered in section 
9.3.2). 
• The Supplicant returns a one-time-password after successful authentication (4.2.1). 
• The Local SIP Proxy issues a new “REGISTER” request (5) towards the SIP-server containing a 
HTTP Digest hash generated over the username and one-time-password, among others. 
• If the HTTP Digest is OK (i.e., the password is correct), the SIP-server responds with “200 OK” 
to the Local SIP Proxy (5.1.1.1.2.1). 
• Finally the Local SIP Proxy responds (5.1.1.1.2.1.1) with a “200 OK” to the SIP UAC. The user is 
now successfully authenticated and the SIP-client registered. 
Figure 65 gives a code listing from the Local SIP Proxy showing how SIP requests are intercepted and 
rewritten if of the appropriate type.  Pay especially attention to the doResponse–method. The first 
REGISTER request is sent without any credentials, and as expected a “401 (UNAUTHORIZED)“ 
response is received. Instead of forwarding the “401 (UNAUTHORIZED)“ to SIP-client, The Local SIP 
Proxy instead calls the authenticate()–method invoking the Supplicant which authenticates 
against the Authenticator.  For the whole process and every detail, see the full source code of the 
Local SIP Proxy in the Appendixes.  
 
Figure 64 Sequence diagram only showing messages and components communicating with Local SIP Proxy 
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Figure 65 Pseudo-code listing from Java prototype of a Local SIP Proxy showing SIP request/response interceptions 
9.4.3 Prototype installation 
The USB dongle is a self-sufficient 
(Smart-Dongle) that incorporates 
all required security functionality 
(i.e., a U/SIM card), procedures for 
user subscription management and 
mobile service access to the IP 
telephony service through a soft-
phone.  
The solution is packaged as a 
Setup-file, copied to a USB dongle, 
configured to automatically run 
when inserted into USB port on a 
computer running the Windows 
operating system.   
Figure 66 Setup wizard for USB dongle 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 102 
The Subscriber starts by installing the SIP-client including the 
Local SIP Proxy (confirms with the Use case: Install SIP-
client). The installation is automated and the whole process 
of installing and configuring the soft-phone is performed 
stepping through a setup wizard. Figure 66 shows the step 
during installation where the Subscriber is asked for a 
(optional) PIN-code and activates the SIM-card (binds the 
SIP-username with the IMSI).  
After installing the SIP-client, the Subscriber can run the SIP-
client (confirms with the Use case: Run SIP-client). Figure 67 
shows a screenshot of the application Express Talk running. 
Finally the Subscriber can choose to either make a call 
(confirms with the Use case: Make call) or if someone is 
calling the Subscriber can choose to accept the call (confirms 
to the Use case: Accept call). 
9.5 Integrate SIP with the personal cloud architecture 
After demonstrating the working prototype of a SIP solution utilizing the mobile phone as an 
authentication token, it’s natural to investigate if the SIP solution could be integrated as a full blown 
SIP service in the personal cloud. 
For a commercial SIP service, 
the SIP-server will typically be 
hosted by a telecom operator, 
which can provide connections 
to PSTN. A telecom operator 
offering mobile phone services 
has HLR / HSS databases which 
can be used for mobile 
authentication, and possibly 
also has a public IdP service.  
This public SIP service can be 
said to be a legacy service 
offered in the public cloud, and 
could be suitable for being wrapped as a service in the personal cloud. If the SIP service allows 
authentication using a mobile phone as an authentication token, as demonstrated by the prototype 
in this chapter, the same authentication process could be used to establish a long-lasting security 
association between the SIP service and the personal cloud IdP. An architecture which allows a SIP 
service to be integrated into and consumed from the personal cloud is proposed in Figure 68. The 
Wrapping Device contains a similar B2BUA solution to the one demonstrated in this chapter, while 
the database maps the different personal cloud IdP certificates to specific SIP identities, so the 
wrapping device placed in the public cloud can offer a personalized service in the personal cloud. 
 
Figure 67 The SipPhone running 
 
Figure 68 Architecture of SIP in the personal cloud 
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The steps involved to establish a 
long-lasting security association 
between the SIP service and the 
personal cloud IdP is illustrated in 
Figure 69. Communication through 
the middleware layer is omitted 
from the next illustrations for 
simplicity, as this is already been 
elaborated. The steps involved: 
• The personal cloud SIdP is in 
this case running on a 
mobile phone (as discussed 
in section 7.5), and the IdP 
now also includes a 
Supplicant. 
• The Supplicant in the SIdP 
authenticates (1) towards an 
Authenticator located with telecom operator, based on U/SIM credentials.  
• The HLR / HSS databases are used to verify the authenticity of the U/SIM (2 and 3). 
• If successfully authenticated (4), the SIdP certificate and SIP identity is securely transferred 
from SIdP to the public IdP (5). 
• The public IdP passes the SIdP certificate and SIP identity on to the wrapping device WDSIP (6), 
which stores them in a database (7). 
Since the wrapping device 
WDSIP is located with the SIP 
server at the telecom 
operator, there is an implicit 
trust between the wrapping 
device and the SIP service. 
Now there is also 
established a long-lasting 
security association 
between the wrapping 
device and the personal 
cloud IdP, and it should be 
possible to authenticate and 
consume the service from 
the personal cloud. 
The process of accessing the 
SIP service from the personal cloud is shown in Figure 70. The steps involved in the process of gaining 
access are described below: 
• The personal cloud telephony service consumer SSIP authenticates towards the SIdP (1). 
 
Figure 69 Associating the personal cloud with a SIP-service in the public 
cloud 
 
Figure 70 SIP service to service access control 
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• If successfully authenticated, the SIdP returns an assertion which includes the SIdP certificate to 
the SSIP (2). 
• The service consumer SSIP requests access to the service WSSIP, by providing its SIP identity 
and forwarding the assertion to the wrapping device WDSIP (3). 
• The wrapping device WDSIP looks up the SIP identity in the database (4), and gets the 
accompanying IdP certificate in return (5). 
• As the assertion is signed by the SIdP and WDSIP now has looked up the the SIdP certificate, 
WDSIP can verify the assertion. 
• The communication between the SIP-client and B2BUA UAS is tunnelled directly from DSIP to 
WDSIP. 
• The SIP-client registers towards the B2BUA UAS (6). 
• The SIP identity received from SSIP is embedded into the B2BUA UAC requests towards the 
SIP-server (7), and the SIP-client has completed registration trough the B2BUA. 
• Further authentication between the B2BUA UAC and SIP-server is not necessary as there is 
an implicit trust between these services, as they are co-located at the telecom operator. 
This section has demonstrated how a security association between the mobile phone IdP and SIP 
service can be established. Then there has been demonstrated how a telephony service consumer 
can authenticate against the personal cloud IdP and gain access to the SIP service by using a 
wrapping device. The wrapping device in turn includes a B2BUA to insert the SIP identity to be 
recognized by the SIP-server, similar to the implemented prototype. By further developing the 
prototype SIP solution, it has been showed that it can be expanded to be fully integrated into the 
personal cloud. 
This chapter has proposed a novel solution for unifying identity management and authentication for 
SIP-based services. By providing a solution where the mobile identity of users may be applied to also 
SIP-based services, a step towards a consolidated subscription is taken. As an added benefit, the 
proposed solution significantly increases the security of SIP by adding two-factor authentication to a 
service commonly authenticated with unsecure username/password combinations, as well as 
providing increased mobility. 
This chapter has shown how mobile security can be used with additional services, and thereby laid 
foundations for further utilization of the mobile phone as a secure authentication token, and also 
proposes how to expand on the prototype to enable utilization of SIP services in the public cloud 
from the personal cloud. 
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10 VPN in the personal cloud 
As a continuation of the previous chapter, security solutions for VPN services have been studied in 
this project. Mobile authentication for VPN services is a second example of mobile authentication in 
services. Although no solution has been implemented yet, some ideas and potential solutions are 
presented in this chapter. The rationale for doing this is to show another approach to embedding the 
mobile phone as an authentication token with a typical service. This chapter will briefly present how 
this could be achieved. For more details, see the paper “Pervasive Service Access with SIM-based 
VPN” in the appendixes. 
To allow controlled access to internal resources, virtual private networks (VPNs) are introduced 
establishing “virtual” connections routed through the Internet. The security of current VPN solutions 
is by many considered unsatisfactory, and suffers from weak authentication such as secret based 
authentication schemes. The more secured VPN solutions are quite often expensive and require the 
usage of security tokens that demand administration from the service provider. Furthermore 
additional care and attention are required from the user since he/she has to carry an extra device. In 
this section SIM based authentication for VPN services will be explored. 
The security functions of VPN are discussed in the background chapter (see section 6.4.2), and 
possess some severe limitations further discussed below. 
Security weaknesses of VPN solutions have been studied in depth in the literature. In [72], several 
common VPN security flaws are described. One major limitation of current VPN solutions lies on its 
first security function, namely the authentication of users. A strong authentication is often both 
expensive and complex to the users while affordable and user friendly authentications tend to be 
weak. The challenge is to incorporate a solution that is secure, cost-efficient and user-friendly. The 
current authentication mechanisms for VPNs suffer from severe limitations. (Section 2.2.2 is covering 
the most common authentication schemes). 
Based on the above observations, the following high level requirements on VPN can be derived: 
1. Provide adequate protection of local resources 
2. Enable easy sharing of resources from remote locations 
3. Provide adequate protection of the user  
4. Offer simpler usage and care from the user  
5. Provide simple and cost-efficient administration for network owners 
10.1 Strong and simple authentication with SIM card 
To satisfy the requirement 3 concerning adequate protection of the user the proposed VPN solution 
must employ strong authentication (see section 2.2.1). Although there is other alternatives the most 
popular authentication is two-factor authentication which combines one first factor characterised by 
“something you know” and a second one characterised by “something you have”. Consequently, 
two-factor authentication requires the usage of an additional device, which demands administration 
from the network owner and extra care from the user. 
To avoid introducing an extra device which could be inconvenient to the user, a SIM-based VPN 
solution proposes to re-use the mobile phone. The mobile phone hosts a SIM, and while the SIM card 
is used for authentication and authorization of the mobile phone to the mobile network, it is also 
found suitable for other services and applications (see section 7.4). A proposition is to extend the 
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usage of the GSM authentication and the SIM card to the VPN authentication. The authentication is a 
strong two factor authentication with the mobile phone as “something you have” and the PIN code 
as “something you know”. The user will benefit from the fact that he/she has one PIN code less to 
remember. The requirement 4 regarding simpler usage and care is hence satisfied. 
As shown in Figure 71 the VPN 
authentication is assumed by the 
SIM card, the Supplicant on the 
client and the Authenticator on 
the network. The SIM is accessed 
across the Ib interface by the 
Supplicant, in a fashion similar to 
the one demonstrated for the SIP 
solution, presented in chapter 9.  
The components are briefly 
presented; The Supplicant is 
located on the user’s device and 
is acting as mediator between 
the authentication device and 
the authentication server 
referred to as the Authenticator 
in this architecture. The Authenticator is the counterpart of the Supplicant, and is the mediator 
towards the mobile telecommunication network components (i.e. Home Location Register (HLR) with 
Authentication Centre (AuC) in GSM network or Home Subscriber Service (HSS). 
10.2 Delegation of authentication to third party 
The biggest obstacles of VPN solutions are the high costs at deployment and most importantly the 
high operational expenses (OPEX) related to the usage of strong authentication. By removing the 
authentication from the VPN solution, the proposed solution becomes much more cost efficient and 
hence satisfying the requirement 5 concerning cost-efficiency. Indeed, the authentication performed 
by the Supplicant and the Authenticator can be administered in a more efficient way by a third party, 
which can be the mobile operator or an identity provider.  
The VPN client is an ordinary VPN client, e.g. supporting either IPSEC or SSL/TLS for establishing 
secure tunnels with a VPN server, that is modified to communicate directly with the Supplicant 
across the Interface Ia (e.g. by utilising the clients plug-in architecture, sockets or any other 
interprocess-communication mechanism), or indirectly using shared memory. 
The VPN server is an ordinary VPN server, which is modified to communicate directly with the 
Authenticator, or indirectly using shared memory. Interface Ic corresponds to the VPN protocols 
supported by the VPN solution. 
10.3 Generation of encryption key with GSM ciphering key 
To protect resources and satisfying the requirement 1 and 2 encryption must be used to establish a 
secure channel between the VPN client and VPN server. The proposed solution provides a simple 
method for generating the encryption key needed for the encryption of data and a safe method for 
the exchange of encryption keys. 
 
Figure 71 The SIM-based VPN functional architecture 
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The Supplicant uses a mechanism similar to the authentication mechanism in GSM and UMTS mobile 
networks (which is based on a challenge-response) (see section 4.3.2) to generate an encryption K 
that can be then passed to the VPN client by the Supplicant. The Authenticator can perform the 
similar operation on its side to generate the same encryption K and transfer it to the VPN server. The 
encryption K can now be used to set up an encrypted connection between the VPN client and server. 
K can be of any length to fit to the encryption algorithm used. 
10.4 VPN as a service in the personal cloud 
As presented in the chapter about personal cloud, the personal cloud will embrace every computing 
device in your personal domain, and will most certainly span across several networks. As suggested, a 
personal cloud gateway (PCG) could be used to interconnect those networks in a secure way. The 
confidentiality requirement of the PCG might well possibly be solved by utilizing a VPN solution. The 
VPN solution proposed in this chapter might be further evolved into using the personal cloud IdP, or 
even an mobile phone IdP, for authentication. Derived from these observations, it could be 
reasonable to further develop the proposed VPN solution and incorporate it into the personal cloud 
gateway for use in the personal cloud. 
This chapter presents a solution where VPN-authentication is separated from the establishment of 
the VPN, delegated to a third party, which can the mobile operator or an identity provider. This way a 
user-friendly and secure VPN solution is achieved. The reuse of a mobile phone for authentication 
adopted in the solution will relieve the user from carrying an extra device and ease deployment and 
administration if incorporated into existing VPN solutions. And finally, this solution for VPN-
authentication could play an important role when realizing the personal cloud. 
  
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 108 
 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 109 
11 Conclusion 
This Chapter summarises the main contributions of this thesis, provides a critical review of the work 
done and some topics for future works. 
11.1 Achievements and results/contributions 
In the first partition of this master thesis, the author has provided background of topics that are of 
high relevance for the main topics of this thesis. Particularly information security concepts such as 
authentication and identity management, mobile technologies and cloud computing, and the state-
of-the-art of motioned topics, while on the same time gaining ground for more personalized services. 
In the next partition, the author has elaborated a new concept for personalized services based on 
services on a user’s devices, services on other user’s devices as well as services in the public cloud. 
The concept is called the personal cloud, and it brings cloud computing into the personal sphere. 
After discussing more general characteristics of the personal cloud, the author has identified security 
as a fundamental topic that has to be paid special attention. Then important security challenges with 
the personal cloud have been discussed. The author has proposed solutions to some of the security 
challenges in the personal cloud, and thereafter the author has introduced the concept of a personal 
identity provider residing in the personal cloud, its main functionalities and how to realise some of 
those. The author has shown how the mobile phone is suitable as an identity provider in the personal 
cloud. 
Using the mobile phone as a personal authentication token has been demonstrated in practice 
through design and implementation of a personalized SIP solution. By introducing a Local SIP Proxy, 
and utilizing the native authentication function of the mobile phone and SIM, the solution 
exemplifies how to personalize services while adding strong authentication. Further, an architecture 
for integrating SIP as a full blown service in the personal cloud is proposed. Corresponding to the SIP 
solution, VPN is presented as an example of another service which can be personalized, and benefit 
from using the mobile phone for adding strong authentication. 
The author has provided a high-level security analysis of cloud computing in general, and particularly 
of the personal cloud, using CORAS. 
The author has published several papers related to various aspects of this thesis. Some of these 
publications were written early, and are therefore not tightly bound to the main topic of the thesis. 
The results are however relevant as background for this study. 
11.2 Critical review / limitations of study 
The author has only implemented one example of a personalized service, a first building block of the 
personal cloud, namely SIM authentication for a telephony service. It would have been interesting to 
implement the more central and critical middleware functions of the personal cloud, such as a 
personal identity provider, preferably also implemented on a mobile phone, and implemented 
establishment of long-lasting security associations. 
The personal cloud is an ambitious concept, and not all aspects of it could be discussed in the scope 
of this thesis due to time and space limitations. There are a lot of challenges other than security 
challenges that could have been thoroughly addressed. 
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The security analysis of cloud computing and the personal cloud using CORAS is only provided at a 
high-level. 
11.3 Future works 
To continue and build on the ideas of the personal cloud, and to provide solutions for the security 
challenges, there are many functions that could be designed and implemented. First a personal 
identity provider for the personal cloud should be designed and implemented. Then the identity 
provider should be moved to the mobile phone by porting or developing it on a mobile platform, and 
add mobile specific functionality such as an integrated Supplicant. Then trust establishment 
functionality as middleware should be designed and implemented. Also basic middleware for service 
consumers and service providers in the personal cloud should be designed and implemented, 
including examples of service wrappers for both legacy services on personal devices and personal 
services in the public cloud. 
It is expected that some of these topics will be pursued by Ubisafe AS through future R&D projects 
(e.g. EUREKA/CELTIC or FP7).  
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12 Appendixes 
There are a number of appendixes, appended at the end of this master thesis; three papers and one 
code-listing, as listed in Table 22:  
Description Type Pages 
Identity management in mobile ubiquitous environments Paper 6 
Pervasive Service Access with SIM-based VPN Paper 6 
Releasing the potential of OpenID & SIM Paper 6 
A Unified Security Architecture for SIP & IMS Code-listing 8 
Table 22 Appendixes 
The appendixes are appended continuously at the end in their original form (as submitted), with their 
original page numbering – without further listing in the table-of-contents or any additional separator 
pages or introduction (except from being mentioned in this chapter).  
12.1 Publications 
The author of this master thesis has contributed to and been a co-author of the following papers 
(Table 23): 
Paper title Conference Authors 
Identity management in mobile 
ubiquitous environments 
IARIA ICIMP ‘08, June, 2008. Johansen, T.A., Jørstad, I., 
van Thanh, D. 
Pervasive Service Access with 
SIM-based VPN 
IEEE MASS ‘09, October, 2009. van Thanh, D., Jørstad, I., 
Johansen, T.A., Bakken, E., 
van Thuan, D. 
Releasing the potential of 
OpenID & SIM 
ICIN 2009, December, 2009. Jørstad, I., Johansen, T.A., 
Bakken, E., Eliasson, C., 
Fiedler, M., van Thanh, D. 
A Unified Security Architecture 
for SIP & IMS 
Submitted to IEEE Globecom 2010. 
In review, tentative, December, 
2010. 
Johansen, T.A., Jørstad, I., 
van Thanh, D. 
Table 23 Publications 
The first three papers are appended as appendixes, while the last one, which is still in the review 
phase, is prohibited from disclosure until the review-period is ended (and hopefully is accepted for 
publication). 
12.2 Source-code-listings 
The source-code listing for “SimpleB2BUAProxyServlet.java” contains the source code the Java-class 
“SimpleB2BUAProxyServlet”, which is the Local SIP Proxy part of the practical exercise of 
implementing a working prototype in section 9.4. The 8 page code-listing is appended as the last 
appendix. 
 
  
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 112 
 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 113 
13 References 
[1] Kasanen, E., Lukka, K. and Siitonen, A. (1993) The Constructive Approach in Management 
Accounting Research. Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 5, p. 243-264. 
[2] Arlow, J., Neustadt, I. (2005) UML 2 and the Unified Process, 2
nd
 Edition, ISBN: 0-321-32127-8.  
[3] Dahl, H. E. I., Hogganvik, I., Stølen, K. (2007). Structured Semantics for the CORAS Security Risk 
Modelling Language, SINTEF, September, 2007. 
[4] Telenor (2007). Identity Management, Telektronikk ¾.2007, 
http://www.telenor.com/telektronikk/volumes/index.php?page=overview&id1=73 
[5] Skip Slone & The Open Group Identity Management Work Area (2004), Identity Management, 
March, 2004, http://www.opengroup.org/projects/idm/uploads/40/9784/idm_wp.pdf 
[6] OATH (2006). An Industry Roadmap for Open Strong Authentication, Initiative for Open 
Authentication, http://www.openauthentication.org/webfm_send/14 
[7] Messina, C., Halff, L. et. al. (2009) OAuth Core 1.0 Revision A, OAuth, June, 2009,  
http://oauth.net/core/1.0a/ 
[8] Rigney, C., Willens, S. et. al. (2000) Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS), The 
IETF Network Working Group, June, 2000, Request for Comments: 2865, 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2865 
[9] Aboba, B. et. al. (2004) Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), The IETF Network Working 
Group, June, 2004, Request for Comments: 3748, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3748 
[10] Haverinen, H., Salowey, J. (2006), Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Global System 
for Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM), The IETF Network 
Working Group, January, 2006, Request for Comments: 4186, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4186 
[11] Liberty Alliance Project (2003) Version 1.1 Interoperability, January, 2003, 
http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/resource_center/papers   
[12] OASIS, WS-Security (2004) SOAP Message Security 1.1, http://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/download.php/16790/wss-v1.1-spec-os-SOAPMessageSecurity.pdf 
[13] W3C, XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition) publication history 2008-06-10, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xmldsig-core-20080610/ 
[14] OASIS (2009) WS-Trust v1.4, February, 2009, http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-
trust/v1.4/os/ws-trust-1.4-spec-os.html 
[15] OASIS, Web Services Federation Language (WS-Federation) v1.2, May, 2009, http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wsfed/federation/v1.2/os/ws-federation-1.2-spec-os.html 
[16] Angal, R., Kaler, C. et. al. (2005) Web Single Sign-On Interoperability Profile, April, 2005, 
http://xml.coverpages.org/WebSSO-InteropProfile200505.pdf 
[17] Angal, R., Kaler, C. et. al. (2005) Web Single Sign-On Metadata Exchange Protocol, April, 2005, 
http://xml.coverpages.org/WebSSO200505.pdf 
[18] OASIS (2005) Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0 March 2005, http://docs.oasis-
open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-2.0-os.zip 
[19] OpenID (2007) OpenID Authentication 2.0, December, 2007, http://openid.net/specs/openid-
authentication-2_0.html  
[20] Eclipse (2008), Higgins Version 1.0, February, 2008, http://xml.coverpages.org/HigginsV10-
Release.html 
[21] D. Chappell (2006) Introducing windows CardSpace, Microsoft Corporation, April, 2006. 
[22] Clifford Neuman, B., Ts, T. (1994) Kerberos: An Authentication Service for Computer Networks, 
September, 1994, IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 32, No. 9, p. 33-38. 
[23] Holtmanns, S. & 3GPP SA WG3 Security (2004) TS 33.220 Generic Authentication Architecture 
(GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture, http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/33220.htm 
[24] Franks, J. et.al. (1999) HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication, The IETF 
Network Working Group, June, 1999, Request for Comments: 2617, 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 114 
[25] Zimmerman, T. G. (1996). Personal Area Networks: Near-field intrabody communication, April, 
1996, IBM Systems Journal, Vol 35, Nos 3&4, 1996. 
[26] M. Weiser (1991). The Computer for the 21
st
 Century, September, 1991, Scientific American 265, 
No. 3, 94–104. 
[27] Satyanarayanan, M. (2001) Pervasive Computing: Vision and Challenges, August, 2001, IEEE 
Explore, ISSN: 1070-9916. 
[28] M. Weiser (1996). Ubiquitous computing. 
http://www.ubiq.com/hypertext/weiser/UbiHome.html 
[29] Trillium Digital Systems, Inc. (2000) Third Generation (3G) Wireless White paper (2000), March, 
2000, http://srohit.tripod.com/wp_3g.pdf 
[30] Wangensteen, A., Lunde, L., Jørstad, I., Do, V.T. (2006). A Generic Authentication System based 
on SIM, International Conference on Internet Surveillance and Protection ( ICISP 2006), August 27-
September 2, 2006, Cap Esterel, French Riviera. 
[31] ETSI/3GPP TS 100.929, Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security-related 
network functions (3GPP TS 03.20 version 8.6.0 Release 1999). 
[32] ETSI/3GPP TS 131.900, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; SIM/USIM 
internal and external interworking aspects (3GPP TR 31.900 version 8.0.0 Release 8). 
[33] ETSI/3GPP TS 133.102, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 3G security; 
Security architecture (3GPP TS 33.102 version 8.4.0 Release 8). 
[34] ETSI/3GPP TR 133.978, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Security aspects 
of early IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) (3GPP TR 33.978 version 7.0.0 Release 7), June, 2007. 
[35] Wong, F. L., Stajano, F. (2005) Multi-channel protocols, Proc. 13
th
 Int’l Workshop Security 
Protocols, LNCS 4631, Springer, 2005. 
[36] Gehrmann, C., Mitchell, C. J., Nyberg, K. (2004) Manual authentication for wireless devices. 
Cryptobytes, 7(1):29–37, 2004. 
[37] Offering SIM Strong Authentication to Internet Services - A joint white paper by Telenor, 
Gemalto, Lucent Technologies, Ulticom, Linus, Oslo University College and Sun Microsystems, 
http://www.strongsim.org/Resources.aspx  
[38] Hallsteinsen, S., Jørstad, I., Do Van Thanh (2007) Using the mobile phone as a security token for 
unified authentication, Systems and Networks Communications (ICSNC 2007), IEEE Explore, ISBN: 
978-0-7695-2938-7. 
[39] Mell, P., Grance, T. (2009). The NIST definition of cloud computing, National Institute of 
standards and technology, NIST, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-def-v15.doc 
[40] Armbrust, M., et. al. (2009). Above the clouds: A Berkeley view of cloud computing, Electrical 
Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California at Berkeley, Technical report, February, 
2009. 
[41] Youseff, L., Butrico, M., Silva, D. D. (2008). Toward a unified ontology of cloud computing, Grid 
Computing Environment Workshop (GCE), Austin, Texas, November, 2008, IEEE Explore, ISBN: 978-1-
4244-2860-1. 
[42] Guttman, E. (2001) Autoconfiguration for IP Networking: Enabling Local Communication, IEEE 
Internet Computing, May/June 2001, http://www.zeroconf.org/w3onwire-zeroconf.pdf 
[43] OASIS (2009) Devices Profile for Web Services (DPWS) v1.1, July, 2009, http://docs.oasis-
open.org/ws-dd/ns/dpws/2009/01 
[44] Leavitt, N. (2010) Will NoSQL Databases Live Up to Their Promise? IEEE Computer Society, 
February, 2010, ISSN:  0018-9162. 
[45] OASIS (2005) Universal Description, Discovery and Integration v3.0.2 (UDDI) February, 2005, 
http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/uddi-spec/doc/spec/v3/uddi-v3.0.2-20041019.htm 
[46] OASIS (2003) UDDI v2, April, 2003, http://uddi.org/pubs/ProgrammersAPI-V2.04-Published-
20020719.htm 
[47] W3C, Semantic Annotations for WSDL and XML Schema, 2007,  
http://www.w3.org/2002/ws/sawsdl/ 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 115 
[48] Kourtesis, D. (2007). Web Service discovery in a semantically extended UDDI registry: The case 
of FUSION, 8
th
 IFIP working conference on virtual enterprises, Guimarães, Portugal, 2007, 
http://www.seerc.org/fusion/semanticregistry/fusion.html 
[49] W3C, Web Services Policy 1.5 2007-09-04, http://www.w3.org/TR/2007/REC-ws-policy-attach-
20070904 
[50] W3C, Web Services Metadata Exchange (WS-MetadataExchange) 2009-12-17, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/WD-ws-metadata-exchange-20091217 
[51] Web Services Dynamic Discovery (WS-Discovery) v1.1, July, 2009, http://docs.oasis-
open.org/ws-dd/discovery/1.1/os/wsdd-discovery-1.1-spec-os.html 
[52] W3C, XML Encryption Syntax and Processing, December, 2002, http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-
core/ 
[53] W3C, The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) Specification, April, 2002, 
http://www.w3.org/TR/P3P/ 
[54] Schulzrinne, H., Handley, M. et. al. (2002) SIP: Session Initiation Protocol, The IETF Network 
Working Group, June, 2002, Request for Comments: 3261, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3261  
[55] Rivest,R., MIT, RSA (1992) MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt 
[56] Harkins, D., Carrel, D. et. al. (1998) The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), The IETF Network Working 
Group, November, 1998, Request for Comments: 2409, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2409.txt 
[57] Pliam, J., Authentication (1999) Vulnerabilities in IKE and XAuth with Weak Pre-Shared Secrets, 
http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsec/99.ipsec/msg01451.html 
[58] Thumann, M., Rey, E., PSK Cracking using IKE Aggressive Mode, 
http://www.ernw.de/download/pskattack.pdf 
[59] Pereira, R., Beaulieu, S. (1999) Extended Authentication within ISAKMP/Oakley (XAUTH), The 
IETF IP Secure Remote Access Working Group, December, 1999,  http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-
ipsec-isakmp-xauth-06.txt 
[60] Samar, V., Schemers, R. (1995) Unified Login with Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM), 
Open Software Foundation, October, 1995, http://www.opengroup.org 
[61] Kent, S., Seo, K. (2005) Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, The IETF Network 
Working Group, December, 2005, Request for Comments: 4301, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4301.txt 
[62] Phifer, L. (2006) Understanding IPSec identity and authentication options, SearchSecurity.com, 
June 2006, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com 
[63] Dierks, T., Rescorla, E. (2006) The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1, The IETF 
NetworkWorking Group, April, 2006, Request for Comments: 4346, 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4346.txt 
[64] Cooper, D., Santesson, S. et. al. (2008) Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, The IETF Network Working Group, May, 2008, Request for 
Comments: 5280, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5280.txt 
[65] Lin, Y., Chang, M., Hsu, M., Wu, L. (2005) One-pass GPRS and IMS authentication procedure for 
UMTS, IEEE Journal on digital object identifier, June, 2005. 
[66] Eap, T.M., Hatala, M., Gašević, D. (2007) Enabling User Control with Personal Identity 
Management, IEEE International Conference on Services Computing, July, 2007, ISBN: 0-7695-2925-9. 
[67] Liu, Q. et. al. (2009). An optimized solution for mobile environment using mobile cloud 
computing, IEEE Explore.  
[68] Gemalto, PC/SC Architecture, http://www.gemalto.com/techno/pcsc/other/aboutpcsc.html 
[69] P. Breyer, et. al. (2008) SIM access profile – Interoperability specification”, Bluetooth Special 
Interest Group, Car Working Group, December 18, 2008 
[70] ETSI/3PP, TS 11.11, Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2) (GSM); Specification of 
the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface (GSM 11.11 version 4.21.1) 
[71] A. Kristensen (ed.) (2003) JSR-116: SIP Servlet API, Java Community Process, February, 2003 
[72] Hills, R. (2005) Common VPN Security Flaws, NTA Monitor Ltd., January 2005, http://www.nta-
monitor.com/posts/2005/01/VPN-Flaws-Whitepaper.pdf 
 
Identity management in future personalized service environments 
 
 116 
 
